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THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
KIMBERLY D. KESSLERt
INTRODUCTION
Tessie Hutchinson held a slip of paper in her hand, and that
paper had a black spot on it. While she stood in the center of the
crowd and screamed, "It isn't fair, it isn't right," the villagers stoned
her to death. Of what, you ask, was Tessie guilty? Nothing. She
was selected by lottery to be the recipient of this punishment. She
had done nothing wrong.
Tessie Hutchinson is merely a character in Shirley Jackson's
"The Lottery."' In this story, luck is the determining factor for
liability. "Well," we may sigh and say, "at least our criminal justice
system is not based on such a premise." We would be wrong,
however. Luck does currently play a role in our legal system. For
example, imagine that Alice is shooting at Bob with intent to kill
him. The following situations are possible:
1) The bullet hits Bob and kills him. Alice is guilty of murder.
2) The bullet hits Bob at exactly the same time Carla's bullet hits
Bob, thus frustrating but-for causation.2 The court will most
likely still hold Alice guilty of murder.
3) A large bird flies in the bullet's path. Thus, the bullet misses
Bob completely. Alice is only guilty of attempted murder.
4) The same large bird flies in the bullet's path and deflects the
bullet. The bullet misses Bob but hits Carla. Alice is guilty of
Carla's murder.
t B.A. 1991, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;J.D. Candidate 1995,
University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professors Michael Moore and
Heidi Hurd for their insightful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to
Andy Lelling and Chad Eisenberger for their comments on earlier drafts. Further
thanks are due to Tony Klapper, Rhonda Kessler, Deborah Pober, and Regina Dodge
for their time and concern, as well as to Professor Leo Katz, whose initial advice led
me down this path.
I would like to dedicate this Comment to the memory of Alice Ticknor.
I ShirleyJackson, The Lotlery, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF SHORT FICTION 372,
378-79 (R.V. Cassill ed., shorter 3d ed. 1986).
2 But-for is the typical test used to prove that the defendant, in fact, caused the
victim's injuries. Here, however, if one asks, "But for Alice's actions would Bob have
died?" the answer is yes; Carla still would have killed him. See infra part III
(discussing the problem cases such as this pose for proving causation).
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Although in each of these cases Alice has performed the same
action with the same intention, she may be guilty of a number of
different crimes: attempting to murder Bob, murdering Bob, or
murdering Carla. This is all because of the "chance" influence of
another actor or some act of fate. Perhaps our world is not any
safer for Tessie.
But there is a difference between our world and Tessie's world.
Tessie did nothing wrong, whereas Alice is someone who chose to
be a murderer. The problem is not that Alice is being punished for
nothing, but rather that sometimes she is not being punished for
what she is-a person who intended to bring about the death of Bob.
Faced with fortuities, courts either have allowed luck to have
relevance, as in the case of attempts, or have twisted legal doctrines
to undermine the role of chance.
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In Part I of this Comment, I will discuss what "luck" is and why
it has no moral or legal relevance. Part II will address the few cases
in which courts have correctly ruled out the role of luck. Parts III
and IV will proceed to discuss two instances, causal overdeter-
mination and transferred intent, in which courts have been forced
to contort legal concepts in attempting to rule out fortuities. Part
V will address an area of the law that still gives credence to chance
happenings-attempts. Part VI then will discuss what role, if any,
causation, the element principally responsible for the role luck
currently plays, should still have in the law. Finally, Part VII will
offer possible solutions for excluding the role of chance.
I. WHAT Is LUCK AND How DOES IT INTERFERE WITH OUR IDEA
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?
A. Luck
Life necessarily includes a degree of luck. We do not have any
voice in selecting our athletic strength, our intelligence, the socio-
economic status into which we are born, our gender, or our race.
Thomas Nagel has labeled this type of luck "constitutive luck."4
Luck can also be involved in the results of our actions.5 Whether
we catch the football, miss the train, or hit the target all involve a
s As in cases of the defendant hitting an unintended victim or of another
independent actor, as well as the defendant, both inflicting injury upon the victim.
'Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57, 60 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).
s See id.
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degree of luck.
But what do we count as luck in comparison to, say, skill or
effort? Social psychology has revealed that we tend to attribute an
actor's achievement of a goal (for instance, catching a football) to
luck when the locus of control is external and the likelihood of
success is minimal or the achievement of the goal is infrequent.'
That is, if the actor is not in control of his success and the frequen-
cy of this type of success is unpredictable, the actor's achievement
can be attributed to luck. For example, if the wind picks up the
football (an external control) and magically delivers it into a player's
hands (a very infrequent occurrence), we will decide he was lucky in
catching the ball. Clearly, however, the lucky receiver's team would
not have to surrender its victory because of this unlikely occurrence.
Why, then, does luck pose a problem for the criminal law?
B. The Moral Argument That Luck Is Irrelevant
Although this Comment is primarily concerned with the legal
argument that luck should not have any place in our criminal justice
system, I believe I should take a moment to address the moral
argument that I will presuppose-that results do not matter morally.
Professor Michael Moore has recently argued to the contrary.7 His
argument, however, contains several flaws.
1. Is There a Problem of Moral Luck?
After reviewing unsatisfactory arguments for his position, Moore
takes issue with Nagel's argument that there is such a thing as moral
luck:'
[T]here is [not] any luck involved in being held more responsible
for successful wrongdoing than for intended or risked wrongdoing
that does not materialize. There undoubtedly is some luck
involved in whether we cause the harms we intend or risk, but
there will be moral luck only vis-a-vis some moral baseline of the
normal that places all such luck on the side of the extraordinary.
9
6 See STEPHEN WORCHEL ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 59-62
(1989) (discussing BERNARD WEINER ET AL., PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF SUCCESS AND
FAILURE (1971)).
7 See Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (forthcoming 1994).
' See id. (manuscript at 31).
9 Id. at 32.
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Although I disagree with Nagel based on what Moore denotes as the
Kantian position-that wrongdoing does not have any independent
moral significance'-Moore's method of attacking Nagel's concep-
tion of moral luck is still of great interest to this discussion.
Moore argues that proximate causation is the arbiter of luck."
Proximate causation limits liability to only those things caused in
the normal routine while absolving defendants of liability in cases
where the causal link is too freakish to bear on the actor's responsi-
bility.12 Moore explores the proximate causation test using four
examples of H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honor6: the defendant who
culpably throws a lit cigarette into bushes that ignite and (1) burn
down a whole forest because of a normal evening breeze, (2) burn
down the whole forest because of an unusual gale force wind, (3)
burn down the whole forest because a would-be extinguisher catches
fire and runs into the forest, and (4) would have burned out except
that another culpable defendant pours a gasoline trail from the
bushes to the forest."5 Moore maintains that since in all four cases
the defendant was equally out of control of the situation, but
liability is imposed only in (1) and (3), control cannot be the
baseline by which moral luck is measured-rather it is freakishness
of the causal route.14 In none of the four cases did the actor
control what happened after she threw away the lit cigarette, but we
only hold her responsible for those actions that seem bizarre and
unforeseeable-gale force winds and evildoers who throw gasoline
on lit cigarettes.
Proximate causation, however, may not serve as a baseline for
moral blameworthiness in the way that Moore contends. As he does
note at one point, the foreseeability test,'5 one of our tests for
proximate causation, "seems to be aimed at an actor's culpabili-
ty." 6 Indeed, isn't this what all proximate causation tests do?
They determine how culpable the actor was and blame her for the
harm equal to that culpability. She is not blamed for those fortu-
10 See id.
11 See id. at 33.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 33-34 (citing H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(1959)).
14 See id. at 34-35.
" Moore rejects foreseeability as a test for proximate causation. See Michael S.
Moore, ForeseeingHarm Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 125,125-26
(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
16 Moore, supra note 7, at 33.
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itous results that she could not choose or control, but that actually
occurred.
Consider, for example, the reckless driver who consciously
disregards the risk that by driving at ninety miles per hour she may
hit another car. If she hits another car, we find it just and fair to
punish her for the risk that she has imposed upon others. If she
hits an airplane that was forced to land on the highway, however,
and the impact results in an explosion killing three hundred people,
we say that this was too freakish, too absurd, to reasonably blame
her for causing. We want to punish the reckless driver for the risk
she chose to consciously disregard 17 and not for the risk she did
not. Proximate causation thus serves to limit her culpability.
Proximate causation proves particularly important in cases of
negligence."8 Negligence by its very definition deals with an actor
who is not aware of what risk she is imposing. Take J.C. Smith's
example of the father who has children who love lemonade and who
leaves weed killer that looks like lemonade in a lemonade bottle.
He did this not to kill his children, but because he is unreasonably
unaware of the fact that they might see it and drink it.l" Using the
proximate causation test, we limit the father's culpability to what we
as a society feel he should have been aware of and do not punish
him for things he would not have foreseen. Thus, if his two child-
ren and their two friends drink it, we will punish him for the
manslaughter (or negligent homicide) of the four children. If, on
the other hand, his children decide to sell this lemonade on the
street, and an airplane pilot buys it on her way to work, in turn
making the pilot so sick she has to land the plane on the highway,
next causing the plane to be hit by a reckless driver, resulting in an
explosion which kills three hundred people, we do not want to say
the father is responsible for all of those deaths.2" Proximate
17See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962) (defining recklessness).
Is I argue later that causation and results do not matter. When determining how
to punish someone who has acted negligently or recklessly but whose actions have not
caused a harm, the fair statutory solution would be to impose the type of punishment
for what we might expect to happen-what we would hold the actor to proximately
cause. Hence, we can learn from the proximate causation doctrine and our intuitions
about it, even if we abandon the causal element.
19 SeeJ.C. Smith, The Element of Chance in Criminal Liability, 1971 CRIM. L. REV.
63, 66.
" If causation were eliminated as a part of the prima facie case in this example,
we would impose a sentence on the father that would reflect what he should have
been aware of, but not the freakish incident concerning the airplane pilot. See also
infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (discussing how reckless and negligent acts
1994] 2187
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causation thus bears on the choice made, or the culpability of the
actor for not being aware he was making a choice, but not as an
arbiter of what counts as being caused by the actor.
2. The Argument from Common Experience
Moore then continues to argue that causing a harm matters
morally on both foundationalist2 1 and nonfoundationalist2 2 views.
Addressing the nonfoundationalist view that Moore endorses, he
relies on our common experiences to show that wrongdoing matters
for retribution.23 He argues, in part, that we react differently to
those who cause harms,24 that we feel greater guilt when we cause
harms, 25 and that in choosing, we believe that the results of our
choices, and not just that we made a good choice, matter to us.
26
Moore contends that our emotions are our "main heuristics" to
discovering what is morally good or bad.2 7 I contend, however,
that we often have emotions about things that matter to us, but do
not necessarily matter to us morally-such is the case with results.
a. Resentment
Results do have their effect on the world. Whether a killer
succeeds in shooting her victim has a significant impact on the
victim and the victim's family. Surely, we resent people who make
this world a worse place to live in by causing harm to others. This
does not mean, however, that they are the only people we think
deserve to be punished for their actions. For example, imagine that
Leigh is recklessly driving in a school zone. She does not hit
anyone. Patty, on the other hand, recklessly drives through the
school zone and hits three children. When Leigh passes by a group
of bystanders, they may think that she is a bad driver and should be
arrested before she kills someone. When Patty hits the children,
they can point to the results of her actions as an indicator of how
culpable she is, whereas they can only imagine what Leigh would
have done. Such an indicator of culpability (having caused a harm)
that do not result in harm should be punished).
21 See Moore, supra note 7, at 41-43.
2 See id. at 49-78.
23 See id. at 56-63.
24 See id. at 56-58.
25 See id. at 58-60.
26 See id. at 60-63.
27 Id. at 57.
THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
causes people to recognize that Patty is a bad person. Should
people rationally think about the harm that Leigh might have
caused, however, they will conclude that there is no distinction to
be made between the two women's culpability.
b. Guilt
Patty may also feel greater guilt than Leigh does (as Moore
contends).2 Many times, however, people make morally correct
decisions that also cause harm. Such people may feel just as guilty.
For example, the woman forced to kill her attacker in self-defense
may feel great guilt at ending the life of another human being, even
if she is morally justified in doing so.2 ' Furthermore, consider a
tragic-choice situation such as a person being forced to decide
whether to switch a runaway trolley from its current track, which
will lead it to hit five people, to a second track, where it will run
over only one person.3" Although I do not wish to join the debate
over which is the "right" choice,"1 the person who makes this deci-
sion may feel guilty no matter what she decides, even if it is "right."
Thus, our emotions may reflect the fact that no one wants to cause
a harm, independent of whether the harm is morally condemned.1
2
Indeed, in the case of a negligent actor (or the reckless actor
who does not believe the risk is that great), the actor's first clue that
she has been culpable may be the materialization of a harm. She
will then feel very guilty about the risk she has imposed on others
in a way that a negligent actor who does not cause a harm may not.
c. Choice
Moore further contends that, since we care very much about the
results of our choices and not just about how we made them, results
must matter morally-3 Imagine, however, that I am going to a
28 See id. at 58-60.
' On the other hand, those people who intend to murder another voluntarily may
feel no guilt about ending the life of another.
s See Judith J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985).
s' See Eric Rakowski, Taking and Saving Lives, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1063, 1064 n.1
(1993) (listing the "voluminous literature" the trolley problem has generated).
32 See also Herbert Morris, Nonmoral Guilt, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE
EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 220, 221 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1989) (discussing various situations in which guilt may be appropriate despite the
absence of wrongdoing).
33 See Moore, supra note 7, at 60-63.
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party and, wishing to be the most beautiful woman there, must
decide whether to wear a red dress or a blue dress. I ask all my
friends, model the dress for my parents, and refer to fashion
magazines before finally deciding to wear the red dress. Suppose,
however, that when I get to the party the greatest fashion tragedy
occurs-another woman is wearing the same dress. I will deeply
regret the fact that I did not wear the blue one. Although I may try
to calm myself down and tell myself that I made the best decision
given the circumstances, the results of my choice will still matter to
me. This is true even though the color of my dress clearly has no
moral significance.
Further, imagine that Danielle's friend, Stacy, is drowning in a
lake. In her mind, Danielle runs through the possible ways to save
Stacy and decides the best method of rescue is to hold out a nearby
tree branch to her. When the branch snaps in half and Stacy dies,
Danielle will feel great guilt in having failed to save her friend.
Clearly the difference between success and failure is very important
to Danielle (alive versus dead friend). Danielle will feel guilty even
if rescue experts tell her she made the best choice. Here, Danielle
is a good person who made a good choice that yielded a bad result.
The fact that Stacy is dead does not make Danielle a bad person.
While we tell our children that "it isn't whether you win or lose,
it's how you play the game," we all know that we care very much
about who wins. Results matter because they affect our lives and
those of other people-we do want to do the best, not just try to do
the best. This does not mean, however, that we should be blamed
for our failures to do so.
3. Moore's Reductio
Finally, Moore presents a reductio argument, which contends
that if we do not hold people responsible for things that they cannot
control, people could not be held responsible for anything since
volitions, intentions, and character are caused by factors beyond
one's control.34 For example, Moore employs Joel Feinberg's
argument that our intentions are sometimes due to factors beyond
our control.3 5 If, for example, Jane is about to form the intention
to shoot Paul, but just before she does so she sees her best friend
3 See id. at 64-70.
' See id. at 71 (discussing JOEL FEINBERG, Problematic Responsibility in Law and
Morals, in DOING AND DESERVING 25, 35 (1970)).
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and forgets all about Paul, her intentions, or lack thereof, are just
as much products of fate.
The slide on this slippery slope stops, however, when we choose
to act on our intentions. All of us are victims of fate to the extent
that we are born into certain families, possess certain talents, and
are presented with certain opportunities. Jane may have gotten
lucky when fate saved her from a position in which she would have
formed the intention to kill Paul. It is also true, however, that the
vast majority of us are lucky that we are not starving in a third-world
country where we might be willing to kill for food. The important
question is whether or notJane is a rational person who knows that
killing is wrong. Once she decides to act upon her intention and
does so, she has shown herself to be a person worthy of punish-
ment. In this sense, Sanford Kadish is correct that "what you
deserve is a function of what you choose."3" Indeed, as Moore has
previously argued, "we are in control ... of our choices because
they are our choices-even though causally dependent on factors
that are themselves unchosen." 7
As rational beings we make decisions in light of our ability to
self-reflect, and we deserve to be held responsible for those
decisions. When our decision does not factor in a change in wind
speed or our victim ducking, however, it makes our decision no less
morally relevant and morally culpable. This is not a "line in the
sand" as Moore contends,"8 but rather the fundamental principle
upon which we are held responsible to begin with.
C. How Luck Conflicts with Criminal Responsibility
The law presupposes that people are "[rational] being[s] who
act[] for intelligible ends in light of rational beliefs."39 Unless
one's practical reason 4 --the ability to rationalize what one should
do based on what one knows and desires-is somehow impaired
(such as by insanity or childhood), we expect that she is capable of
conforming her conduct to fall within the boundaries of the law.
" Id. at 73 (quoting Sanford Kadish, Tracking the Irrational in the Criminal Law
17-18 (1993) (unpublished Faculty Research Lecture, University of California,
Berkeley, on file with author)).
" Id. at 75 (citing Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
201 (1985)).
38Id. at 73.
S9 MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 66
(1984).
4 For a thorough analysis of the practical reasoning process, see id. at 9-14.
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For example, Tony wants one hundred dollars. Tony knows that he
can either work to earn the hundred dollars or he can steal the
money from Andy. Tony knows that stealing is illegal. Tony does
not want to go to jail. Therefore, Tony will get a job.4  Unless
Tony's constitutive luck rises to the level of rationality impairment,
the criminal law expects him to conform his conduct to the law
because he is able to; the fact that Tony is born poor does not
prevent him from understanding the law and abiding by it.4"
Capable of acting on our own beliefs and desires, we expect to
be held criminally responsible only for our decisions to disobey the
law4 3 and not for the workings of fate. This assumption is mani-
fested in the criminal law in the prima facie case, which requires a
voluntary action and a guilty mind in order to hold someone
criminally responsible.
The actus reus, or act requirement, is essential to the prima
facie case.44 You can wish that Alice would die, intend to kill her,
and she can drop dead, but if you did not do something-act upon
your intentions in any way-then you are not guilty of murder. You
are also not guilty, according to the criminal law, unless you engage
in the action voluntarily.4" Thus, when Al moves Betty's finger,
41 Tony could conceivably decide that he would rather risk going tojail than have
to work. This is a decision that, as a rational agent, Tony could make. If, however,
Tony gets caught, we can punish him because he knew what he was doing was wrong,
he could conform his conduct, and yet he chose to break the law.
42 This Comment does not attempt to undertake the determinism debate beyond
what is implicit in my discussion of Moore's moral argument. See supra notes 34-38
and accompanying text; see also Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of
Resulting Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 742-43
(1988) (noting the interplay of moral luck and determinism in arguments about the
culpability of attempters as compared to those who have succeeded in completing
their crimes). Determinism is the strain of philosophy that believes that everything
is caused. While hard determinists believe that free will and determinism are not
compatible, soft determinists believe that there is still room for responsibility in a
determined world despite the absence of free will if one is capable of acting on one's
practical reason. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM 83 (1984).
4' Although most crimes require at least a conscious decision to disregard a risk
(recklessness), sometimes the criminal law will hold us responsible when we were
unreasonably unaware of the risk or harm we caused. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 2.02(2)(c), 210.4 (defining recklessness and negligent homicide respectively).
44 For the rationale behind the act requirement, see MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND
CRIME 46-59 (1993); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 9.01[B], at 63-65 (1987) (arguing against punishing for thoughts); Ashworth, supra
note 42, at 733 (explaining the rationale for both the actus reus and mens rea).
45 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (requiring voluntary act); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK,
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 90-93 (1987) (discussing involuntary conduct); see also
People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 376 (1970) (holding unconsciousness, even if
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forcing it (her) to pull the trigger, Betty does not murder Carla.
The criminal law further requires a mental state, or mens rea.
Although some crimes are strict liability crimes, 46 we believe that
people should only be punished for those actions for which they
have a guilty mind. This element is justified on both utilitarian4 7
and retributivist4 s grounds: these people are both deserving of
punishment and deterrable. 49 They are deserving of punishment
because they have rationally decided to break the law, and they are
deterrable because they chose to engage in an illegal activity after
weighing the benefits and costs of abiding by the law. Since they
reason through their actions, people with guilty minds will be
the defendant physically acts, "a complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide").
46 Strict liability imposes liability without regard to whether the defendant made
a mistake or the act (or harm) was accidental. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW § 9.3.2, at 716 (1978). Impure food and drug regulations are one
category of this type of prohibited conduct. See id. Because such regulations are not
typically based on those things that are bad in and of themselves (malum in se) but
rather those that are bad because the law says they are (malum prohibitum), strict
liability does not carry with it the same moral force.
The Model Penal Code makes a "frontal attack" on strict liability: "Crime does
and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment
unless it can declare the defendant's act was culpable. This is too fundamental to be
compromised." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1, at 283 (1985) (footnote omitted);
see also Steven J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1513 (1974) ("If...
there ever was a feeling that those who commit strict liability crimes were somehow
morally responsible for the harm they caused, that feeling has probably been
dispelled today: if anything, punishment of these crimes may tend to weaken respect
for law and must be justified on other grounds." (footnote omitted)).
Utilitarians are concerned with net social gain. We punish people (which is an
evil because it makes the person being punished unhappy) because punishment will
deter others (a good) and it will rehabilitate the wrongdoer (another good). These
goods outweigh the unhappiness of the wrongdoer. See JAMES RACHELS, THE
ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 117-19 (1986).
48 Rachels explains the idea of retributivism as the only proper way to hold
rational beings accountable for their actions:
[R]ational beings are responsible for their behavior and so may properly be
"held accountable" for what they do. We may feel gratitude when they
behave well, and resentment when they behave badly. Reward and
punishment-not "training" or other manipulation-are the natural
expression of this gratitude and resentment. Thus in punishing people, we
are holding them responsible for their actions, in a way in which we cannot
hold mere animals responsible. We are responding to them not as people
who are "sick" or who have no control over themselves, but as people who
have freely chosen their evil deeds.
Id. at 123.
4 See DRESSLER, supra note 44, § 10.03, at 97-98 (discussing the rationale of the
mens rea requirement).
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influenced by sanctions which increase the risk of detection or the
punishment inflicted upon them if they get caught.
50
Luck is not involved in either of the previous elements. You do
not "luck out" and find yourself intending to shoot someone," and
if you fire a gun accidentally, the criminal law will not punish you
more than your mental state deserves.5 2 Luck plays no role in
whether one forms the intention and then engages in the action;
one is punished solely as a rational agent, not as a victim of fate.
Some crimes require the additional element of causation. The
causal/result requirement differs from the requirements of an actus
reus and a mens rea. The actor has very little control over whether
her actions will ultimately end in their intended result. After John
shoots at Mary, he has no control over whether the bullet will hit
her, she will duck, a large gust of wind will blow the bullet away,
Mary will be wearing a bullet-proof vest, or a large bird will deflect
the bullet. 3 Hence, the causal/result requirement conflicts with
o Steven Shavell, however, argues that people who intend their actions are more
difficult to deter for two reasons. First, because they intend their actions, they
obviously have a goal in mind and thus have more to gain from breaking the law.
Second, those who intend their actions will plan against detection and will thereby be
more difficult to catch. See Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts,
19J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 449 (1990).
But is this really so? Consider the case of Darcy who kills Judy. If Darcy does
so by accident (addressing Shavell's latter point), it is true that we are more likely to
find out about it. But why does this matter? Darcy is not guilty of a crime, and her
detection is insignificant. Further, how can we deter Darcy with harsher punishments
if she did not intend to kill Judy in the first place? Even if the death penalty was
mandatory for all murders, how would this deter Darcy from accidentally (it could
have happened to the most careful person) killingJudy?
On the other hand, if Debbie wants to killJulie, she will also know the punish-
ment involved and will then weigh whether it is worth it to dispose ofJulie. The
consequences that might follow will have a greater influence on whether Debbie en-
gages in her intentional murder than whether Darcy engages in her accidental killing.
51 But see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52 Depending upon the facts, such a firing might be negligent, a sufficient mental
state for some crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (defining negligent
homicide).
"John only has control over these factors to the extent that he takes preparatory
steps towards their prevention: spying on Mary to make sure her bullet-proof vest is
at the cleaners, taking shooting lessons, checking the weather conditions to ensure
it is not an incredibly windy day, or shooting at her somewhere where large birds will
not come within the path of the bullet. To this extent, luck will be the residue of
good design. Note, though, that the person who plans less has the same murderous
intention as the person who takes these extra steps. The point is that the person who
allows more room for luck should not receive less punishment because her plan
failed. John's extreme preparations will clearly be evidence of his premeditation
about killing Mary, but if Paul has also planned to kill Laura for weeks, the fact that
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our view that rational agents should be held accountable for their
actions: it allows fortuity to determine their crime. This is
something upon which criminal responsibility should not depend.
II. RULING OUT LUCK: WHEN COURTS HAVE GOTrEN IT RIGHT
A. Justificatory Intent
Marie is about to shoot Chad. Chad, unaware of Marie's plan,
throws a kitchen knife at Marie and kills her. Did Chad murder
Marie or did he act in self-defense? In this case, "the actor is
unaware of the exculpating fact .... His act is objectively right, but
subjectively wrong. It is the converse of the problem to be treated
in the theory of mistake, in which the conduct is objectively wrong,
but subjectively right."54 Chad intended to murder Marie, but, in
reality, he acted in self-defense. What should the law do with him?
Since his claim does not go to the nature of the offense55 but
rather to his justification, courts have held that he must believe that
he is in danger in order to claim that he acted in self-defense. 6 As
Kent Greenawalt maintains, "[o]ne subjective characteristic of the
actor is crucial .. . for justification in both ordinary usage and in
the law: his belief in the presence of justifying circumstances. If,
unknown ... [the actor's] claim of self-defense is unavailing."
57
Hence, in this case, courts are getting the answer right.5 " Chad is
someone who decided to kill another human being. He should not
"luck out" just because, as it turns out, Marie was going to kill him.
he did not take as many precautions does not lessen his intent to commit murder.
FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 7.4.1, at 556.
If, however, Dick, thinking he is already married, marries Jane in order to be
a bigamist, but in reality his first marriage is not valid, Dick is not guilty of bigamy
no matter what his intent is. See id. at 555-57. Dick will be guilty of attempted
bigamy, and as I maintain in this Comment, should be punished as if he had
succeeded. See generally infra part V.
See FLETCHER, supra note 46, § 7.4.1, at 557.
Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897, 1916 (1984) (footnote omitted).
' For a contrary view, see MOORE, supra note 39, at 180-82 ("D no more
murdered anyone than does the person who tries to shoot another to death but
whose bullet misses. Both are very culpable, but neither has done the wrong of
murder because neither has killed a human being who was not about to kill an
innocent party." (footnote omitted)); see also Paul H. Robinson, A Theoy of
Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisitefor Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266,
289 (1975) ("One's mental state simply cannot convert otherwise harmless conduct
into a crime ... ." (footnote omitted)).
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B. California and Spring Guns
In People v. Ceballos,59 the defendant, Don Ceballos, set a
spring gun in his garage/dwelling after noticing that someone had
attempted to break into it. When sixteen-year-old Stephen broke
into Ceballos's garage, he was shot in the face with the .22 caliber
pistol Ceballos had rigged.6" Ceballos contended that since he
would have been allowed to use deadly force had he been there, he
should be allowed to use deadly force when he was not-thereby
doing indirectly what could have been done directly.
The Supreme Court of California disagreed. In doing so, it
departed from the traditional rule that such devices are acceptable
in cases in which the defendant would have been justified in using
deadly force had she been there.61 The court held that "whatever
may be thought in torts, the foregoing rule setting forth an
exception to liability for death or injury inflicted by such devices 'is
inappropriate in penal law for it is obvious that it does not prescribe
a workable standard of conduct; liability depends upon fortuitous
results.' 6 California has decisively ruled out the ability for chance
to determine liability in this case-setting up a spring gun is wrong
no matter who it happens to hit or what the circumstances are.
Thus, one is not absolved of guilt because the spring gun hits a
would-be murderer (and one would have been able to shoot her had
one been there) rather than a small child attempting to retrieve her
basketball (in which case one could not have shot the child had one
been present).
C. California and Felony-Murder
In People v. Washington,6" the defendant and his accomplice,
James Ball, tried to rob a gasoline station.64 In the course of the
robbery a victim, John Carpenter, shot and killed Ball.65 Defen-
dant was convicted of the murder of his accomplice under a felony-
murder statute.6 The defendant, on appeal before the Supreme
" 526 P.2d 241 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
60 See id. at 243.
61 See id. at 244 (listing numerous cases endorsing the traditional rule).
62 Id. at 244-45 (emphasis added) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06 cmt. 15
(Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958)).
6' 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965) (en banc).
64 See id. at 132.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 133.
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Court of California en banc, argued that he should not be charged
with this murder because (1) a robber and not a victim was killed
and (2) a victim and not a robber did the killing.
The court decided not to reverse his conviction on the first
ground. It reasoned that "[a] distinction based on the person
killed ... would make the defendant's criminal liability turn
upon the marksmanship of victims and policemen. A rule of
law cannot reasonably be based on such a fortuitous circum-
stance."67 Hence, the court was unwilling to allow a defendant's
responsibility to be determined by what target the bullet found. A
nervous victim's aim would not decide whether the felon had caused
a murder.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court of California held that
the defendant could not be held responsible for a killing not in the
perpetration of the robbery (that is, not by one of the robbers).68
It reasoned that the purpose of the felony-murder rule, to deter
felons from accidental and negligent killings, would not be served
by holding them responsible for their victim's actions.6" The court
further noted how chance could play a role if they allowed liability
for victim's killings: "To impose an additional penalty for the killing
would discriminate between robbers, not on the basis of any
difference in their own conduct, but solely on the basis of the
response by others that the robber's conduct happened to in-
duce." 7' Thus, the court recognized that the robbers should only
be punished for what was in their control and not for the chance
occurrence that some victims might retaliate.
III. COURTS AND CAUSAL OVERDETERMINATION: CONTORTING
FACTUAL CAUSATION TO RULE OUT LUCK
Causal questions are typically bifurcated.7' We first ask
whether the result Y would have occurred without the act or
omission X, and we then apply a limiting principle to those Xs that
satisfy the first test.72 For example, John would not have hit Mary's
6 Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
6' See id. at 133.
69 See id.
70 Id.
7 See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR-, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 104 (2nd ed. 1985)
(discussing the division of the question of causation into elements of fact and legal
policy).
7 See id.
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car if he had never been born. Hence, John's mother and father are
causes of the accident according to the first half of the test. Their
legal responsibility, however, is limited by the proximate cause
requirement: the car accident was not part of the risk of having a
child, the accident was not foreseeable, and John was a voluntary
intervening actor.
The first question is a factual one: Did the defendant actually
cause the harm? The second part of the question is one of policy:
Should we hold the defendant responsible for that which she
caused?"' Causation-in-fact is thus simply that-a factual question.
To determine whether X caused Y we typically employ the but-for
test:74 But-for the alarm clock going off, would Tom have gotten
out of bed? If Tom would have overslept and missed his criminal
law class discussing causation, then Tom's alarm clock is the cause
of Tom's getting up and going to class.
Sometimes, however, it is difficult to determine whether an act
satisfies the but-for test. Jane's alarm clock also went off this
morning. At the same time Jane's alarm clock went off, her phone
rang. Jane turned off her alarm and answered the phone. But-for
Jane's alarm clock going off would Jane still be sleeping? Perhaps
not. She might have gotten up anyway to answer her phone. Jane's
case is an example of causal overdetermination: even if X did not
happen, Y would have occurred because of Z.
75
There are two possible approaches to take towards these cases.
We may declare that but-for is not an appropriate test for causation.
" See Nancy L. Firak, Alternative Forms of Liability: Developing Policy Aspects of the
Cause-in-Fact Requirement of Tort Law, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1041, 1041-42 (1988) ("Judges
and commentators have long recognized that the proximate cause inquiry is
essentially a question of policy that limits the potential liability of one whose conduct
is clearly a factual cause of another's injury." (footnote omitted)); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1742-44 (1985) (distinguishing policy
questions from factual causation); see also supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text
(arguing that proximate causation serves to limit the actor's culpability).
* The Model Penal Code uses but-for as the test for cause-in-fact. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a).
' Cases such as the one ofJane's phone and alarm clock are labeled as problems
of causal overdetermination. The result is overdetermined because either of the
events (the phone or the alarm) might have been sufficient by itself. Causal
overdetermination may occur in two types of cases. The first is preemption-where
one defendant's actions cause harm before the other's can. For example, ifJane puts
slow-acting poison inJohn's soup and then Kelly shootsJohn in the heart, causing his
immediate demise, Kelly has preempted Jane's actions. The defendant may also
combine with or duplicate the injury caused by another. For example, bothJane and
Kelly may put poison in John's soup. See Wright, supra note 73, at 1775.
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Thus, causation does exist in these cases: it is just that running
counterfactuals-relying on a world of "what ifs"-is an unsatisfactory
way of discovering it.76 We may then attempt to redefine the test
so that the act does satisfy the causation-in-fact test (and at times
still continue to rely on but-for in ordinary cases). These redefini-
tions of causation-in-fact, however, are either easily manipulable or
are not employed by the courts. The second approach is to admit
that we cannot prove causation in this case but then still attribute
responsibility on policy grounds. Since neither solution is accept-
able, the correct solution is to eliminate the causal requirement
altogether.
A. Altering the Test
1. Specifying the Harm
But-for causation necessarily includes the use of counterfactuals.
But-forJohn's actions would Bob have been killed? But against what
baseline are we to compare John's actions?
When we say, contrary to fact, that "but for x, y would not have
occurred," there is a lot that we have left unsaid. Two items we
have not mentioned are, first, what are we to imagine happened
in place of x? If the statement in question is, "if Smith had not set
foot on the steps, the rotten beams under them would not have
collapsed," what replaces "Smith setting foot on the steps" to test
the truth of this counterfactual? If we replace it with "Smith using
a different stairway," the counterfactual may well be true; if we
replace it with, "Smith bounding up the steps at just the time he
"' See Robert N. Strassfield, If... : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 339, 404 (1992) ("It is not clear whether we see uncertainty or
overdetermination as a result of asking the counterfactual question, or whether we
merely use the counterfactual to articulate an already drawn conclusion."); see also
LEO KATZ, BAD AcTs AND GUILTY MINDS 233-36 (1987) (arguing that but-for is not
the same as causation); MOORE, supra note 39, at 269-74 (discussing various problems
with the but-for test).
The current use of but-for might be likened to the approach of testing whether
the Earth has gravity by dropping helium balloons from the Empire State Building.
It is not the Earth's lack of gravity that makes the test fail, but the fact that helium,
which is lighter than air, causes the balloons to rise rather than fall. Dropping
bowling balls would yield the correct results.
The problem here may be similar. Perhaps but-for as a test for causation is
comparable to the helium balloon as a test for gravity-something about the but-for
test makes it an unwise measuring stick. However, the failure of the but-for test does
not prove the absence of causation any more than the failure of a dropped helium
balloon to fall proves the absence of gravity.
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actually walked up the steps," it may seem to be false. Second,
even once we choose, say, "Smith using a different stairway" as the
replacement, how many other things in the world are we to
imagine having also changed along with Smith's change of
entrance?... Perhaps Jones, who is Smith's chauffeur and who is
heavier than Smith, dropped Smith off at the safe entrance only to
run Smith's forgotten briefcase up the rotten one. If this is what
we vary, then the counterfactual may seem to be false; other
events, neutral to weight equal to or greater than Smith's being on
the stairs at the relevant time, would leave the counterfactual
true.
7
Professor Moore presents a solution to this problem of which
possible world to pick for causation questions. First, he notes that
X and Y are not event-types but rather event-tokens. 7 That is, the
X does not stand for all the possible types of events that might have
occurred (thus leading to the problem of incompleteness about what
should be in place of Smith bounding up the stairs). 79 Rather, the
question is whether "Smith walking up the steps did cause the
collapse of the stairs ... if Smith had not walked just as he did, the
stairs would not have collapsed just as they did."0 Therefore, by
this analysis, the solution to the problem of counterfactuals in but-
for causation is to ask: but-for the defendant's action would the
injury occur as it did?
This solution, however, has been subject to criticism. Richard
Wright argues that such a solution begs the question: "To include
how the result came about in the description of the result is to
assume an answer to the causal issue before it is posed.""1 The
solution further fails to address the problem of causation in cases
where two bullets, shot simultaneously, kill a person; but-for either
party's action, the defendant still would have died by shooting. 2
7 Michael S. Moore, Thomson's Preliminaries About Causation and Rights, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 497, 508 (1987) (footnote omitted).
78 See id. at 510.
7 See id.
o Id. at 510-11; see also People v. Lewis, 57 P. 470 (Cal. 1899). The victim in Lewis
cut his own throat after the defendant shot him. The court viewed the harm as
resulting from both actions: "[A]fter the throat was cut [the victim] continued to
languish from both wounds. Drop by drop the life current went out from both
wounds, and at the very instant of death the gunshot wound was contributing to the
event." Id. at 473.
"' Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and
Proof. Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IowA L. REv. 1001, 1025
(1988). For Wright's explicit criticism of Moore's position, see id. at 1040 n.219.
' See id. at 1026.
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Finally, such a test extends causation to clearly extraneous factors:
but-for Smith's actions would the stairs have broken with Smith
walking on them, wearing his new blue silk tie, on the third Tuesday
in June? 3 Indeed, Moore himself has recognized the problems
inherent in this analysis:
Far from rescuing the counterfactual analysis of causation, this
defence reveals the incompatibility of that analysis with the idea
that it is particular events that stand in causal relations. For no
reason is given for why we should prefer a more detailed descrip-
tion of a harm-token to a less detailed one. And without some
criterion for selecting the appropriate level of description, the
causal relation (as analysed counterfactually) is completely
indeterminate in all cases.
8 4
2. The Substantial Factor Test
In cases of causal overdetermination some courts will rely on the
substantial factor test as a substitute for the but-for test. For
example, in J.N. v. United States8 5 the court addressed the defen-
dant's argument that the termination of heroic life support
measures broke the causal chain and thus the defendant did not
cause the victim's death. The court stated that the defendant must
prove that: (1) the two actions were distinct 6 and (2) that the
defendant's actions were "not a 'substantial factor' contributing to
the victim's death.""7 Although the court never reached the second
question, since it concluded that the termination of medical
treatment was linked to the victim's act, 8 the court did pose the
' See id. at 1025-27. One could accept this argument and concede that any
condition could be a cause-in-fact. Responsibility would then still be limited by
proximate causation tests. Yet how, by any definition of causation, could Smith's
wearing a blue silk tie cause the collapse of the stairs?
8 Moore, supra note 15, at 144.
s 406 A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1979). In this case, the defendant and his cohorts
attempted to steal an elderly woman's purse. See id. at 1278. One of the robbers hit
the woman on the back of the head, causing her to fall on the sidewalk. See id. The
defendant, who was convicted of attempted robbery and felony murder, argued that
when the victim's doctor terminated life support, the doctor broke the causal chain
and thereby insulated the defendant from liability. See id. at 1284.
" That is, the defendant must prove that his action did not cause the further
action. For example, ifJake's alarm clock goes off for several minutes without waking
Jake up, and thenjake's slightly perturbed roommate, Alex, dumps a bucket of water
onjake's head, the actions are not distinct. Jake's alarm clock going off caused Alex
to dump the water onJake's head. Alex would not have done so otherwise.
87 406 A.2d at 1286.
13 See id. at 1286-87.
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substantial factor question in a footnote:
[A] defendant may persuade the fact finder that, subsequent to his
shooting the victim, the victim was fortuitously shot again by an
unknown and unrelated assailant, and that the victim died from
the loss of blood from both wounds. Although the defendant may
have demonstrated that he is not liable for the consequences of
the acts of the second assailant, his defense of intervening cause
will nevertheless fail if the wound inflicted by the defendant
substantially contributed to the decedent's death.89
The substantial factor test has several problems. First, the test
itself combines both causation-in-fact and proximate causation since
jurors will determine whether a factor is substantial enough to count
as a cause. Thus, a purely factual question becomes one of
policy. It is as if we were to say that plants grow toward sunlight
because they need it to live. Furthermore, the test is circular: it
says that if X is a substantial factor in causing Y, then X caused Y.
The test does not tell us what it means "to cause" in the first place.
Finally, as Strassfield indicates, the test is "contentless, or it
reintroduces and complicates counterfactual inquiry. It directs the
fact finder to measure the significance or substantiality of a
particular cause against an unspecified yardstick."9' Hence,
avoiding fortuity in this way leads to an unworkable causation test.
3. NESS and Becht and Miller
The Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set ("NESS") test states
that "a particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing
to) a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary element
of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the
occurrence of the consequence."9 2 To understand NESS, consider
the following hypothetical situations presented by Wright:
1) Fire Xreaches a house but Fire Ydoes not. Since there is only
one sufficient set of fires that burned down the house and X was
89 Id. at 1286 n.10 (emphasis added).
o See David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV.
1335, 1347; Strassfield, supra note 76, at 355; Wright, supra note 73, at 1782.
", Strassfield, supra note 76, at 355. It may be argued that the jury's subjective
feelings of justice as to what is or is not a cause is the yardstick. This, however,
inevitably introduces juror's feelings about what should count as a cause. Thus, it is
inconsistent with the nature of the cause-in-fact inquiry, which should be a factual and
not a policy decision.
' Wright, supra note 73, at 1790 (emphasis omitted).
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a necessary element of that set, X caused the house to be burned
down.
2) Fires X and Yboth reach the house at the same time. Since X
was a necessary element of one set, not containing Y and vice
versa, both fires can be held to cause the burning of the house
despite the fact that but-for causation is not satisfied.
3) Fire Y only reaches the house after Fire X has burned it down.
The set containing Fire Y did not actually cause any damage, and
thus, only Fire X destroyed the house.
9 3
In the case of Smith, his walking on the stairs was necessary to
the stairs' collapse (what actually happened). His blue silk tie, on
the other hand, was not a necessary element of that set. 4 Arno
Brecht and Frank Miller's test is similar; it requires, however, that
the condition be a necessary element of the set of antecedent condi-
tions, not simply any set of antecedent conditions as NESS
requires. 5  Wright demonstrates how this test fails to solve
overdetermination cases by posing the hypothetical of a cable,
capable of holding one ton, that is negligently weakened by C, thus
reducing how much weight the cable can withstand. 6 D then
negligently places two tons of weight on the cable; thus, even if the
cable were in perfect condition, it would break. 7 The cable does
break and the weight injures P. Both C and D are part of the causal
sequence that produced the injury, but neither is necessary because
the harm would have occurred anyway. s Thus, Becht and Miller's
test does not solve the problem of overdetermination in all cases.
9 9
" See Wright, supra note 81, at 1022. Here, though, the person who created Fire
Y is benefitting from the fortuity of the earlier arrival of Fire X. If causation were
treated as irrelevant, Fire Y, which created the same risk as Fire X, would not benefit
from this working of chance. Rather, both fire creators would be subjected to the
same degree of punishment. (I do not, however, advocate the abandonment of
causation for torts. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.)
' If Smith had a stone in his pocket or was wearing a heavy jacket, these factors
would be a cause to the extent that they were elements necessary for the collapse of
the stairs.
" See Wright, supra note 73, at 1787 (discussing ARNO C. BRECHT & FRANK W.
MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
CASES 32 (1961)).
96 See id. at 1787-88.
9" See id. at 1788.
98 See id.
9 See id. at 1787. Such a hypothetical would survive NESS analysis because C's
actions are necessary as part of a set where D applies the correct amount of weight
to the cable, and D's actions are necessary to the set of antecedent conditions where
C behaves nonnegligently.
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Brecht and Miller conclude that they would still hold the defendants
liable for policy reasons.'
While Brecht and Miller's test is unworkable because of its
inability to solve overdetermination problems, NESS is able to solve
counterfactual problems.' Courts, however, do not apply it. In
fact, neither the Model Penal Code nor the Restatement of Torts
endorse it either." 2 As Wright points out, in cases such as Corey v.
Havener,' where two motorcycles were alleged to have frightened
the plaintiffs horse, the court simply did not require the plaintiff
to prove that either was sufficient to scare the horse. 10 4 Hence,
despite the evolution of a test that may actually determine factual
causation, courts have yet to engage in NESS analysis to determine
causation-in-fact.
B. Relying on Policy
Some courts and commentators are unwilling to twist causation
into the previously described contortions. Recognizing the problem
involved in defining but-for causation, they simply concede that they
cannot define, or therefore even attempt to prove, but-for causation.
"Okay," they say, "we can't prove she caused it, but who cares?"
Feinberg presents the most common argument for this position by
discussing the liability of a cab driver who seriously injures his
passenger in an accident and thereby prevents the passenger from
catching his plane, which explodes without him on board:
[I]t is perfectly just to hold [the taxicab driver] liable for the full
damages, including those beyond what he actually caused, because
only an unforseeabe [sic] fluke of chance (e.g. a plane crash)
accounts for the brevity of the period during which the counterfac-
tual condition continued to be satisfied. In short, [the cab driver]
harmed [the passenger] because there was some period, however
brief, during which the counterfactual condition was satisfied, and
he is justly answerable for the effects of the harm he originally
caused, since it was only afluke of chance, not anything he can claim
credit for, that limited the scope of his harming. The harmful
1oo See id.
101 See id. at 1788 (describing NESS as a "test for causal contribution that is
applicable to the entire spectrum of causation cases").
'02 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a) (adopting the but-for test of causation);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977) (adopting the substantial factor test
of causation).
103 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902).
'o' See id. at 69; Wright, supra note 73, at 1792.
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residue has to be paid for by someone, and it seems less unfair to
charge it to the original wrongdoer than to the hapless victim. 5
Although Feinberg addresses the liability of the first actor of
alternative causes,10 6 Dressler's approach to questions of alterna-
tive causes is to ask simply "what caused a result rather than what
might have caused it if the circumstances had been different."
107
Dressler also employs policy considerations but only in the situation
where there are concurrent sufficient causes. Where DI shoots V in
the heart at the same moment that D2 shoots V in the head and
either attack alone would have immediately killed V, Dressler
addresses the result that neither can be guilty of the murder if the
but-for test is applied:
10 8
Why should we not give the actors the benefit of the fortuity here?
The reason why we balk at this is that in the other case [preemp-
tive causation] there is a party-X-who can be convicted of
murder; here, use of the but-for test results in nobody being
convicted of murder.
0 9
The policy at issue here is very clear. The defendant is a "bad"
person. She has shown she is a bad person by both her actions and
her mental state."1 She may not "luck out" and be absolved of
responsibility because the result would have occurred even without
her acting. She has done all that is necessary to complete the crime;
we will not let sheer coincidence free her from responsibility.
n'
105 Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4J. Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 145, 153 (1987) (emphasis added).
" This type of overdetermination is similar to L.E. Loeb's example of Harry who
decides to use only one color of poisonous mushrooms (not both brown and white)
to kill Harriet. He flips a coin and only uses the white ones. Had he not, he would
have used the brown ones, which also would have killed Harriet. See Charles B.
Cross, Counterfactuals and Event Causation, 70 AUSTL.J. PHIL. 307, 310 (1992) (citing
L.E. Loeb, Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination, 71 J. PHIL. 525-44 (1974)).
107 DRESSLER, supra note 44, at 162.
"o See id. at 161. Neither will be guilty because but-for DI's actions, V would still
have died because of D2. But-for D2's actions V would still have died because of D1.
'09 Id. at 161 n.9; see also Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 941, 951 (1935) ("The real policy behind imposing liability in such cases... is
that wrongdoers should not be permitted to escape the consequences of their wrong-
ful acts."); James A. McLaughlin, Note, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 153
(1925) ("Faced with the dilemma of saying each caused it or neither caused it, we say
that each caused it rather than let each actor escape if the other elements of liability
are present.").
n" Obviously, "bad" is defined as -being only negligent in the case of the cab
driver.
" Note, however, that when we do this, we accept that the defendant fails to be
the cause-in-fact of the harm. Even though one of the elements of the prima facie
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C. Conclusions
To determine whether a defendant actually caused an injury,
courts either employ inadequate causal tests or turn to policy to
solve cause-in-fact inquiries. Hence what was meant to be a scienti-
fic, objective analysis of what actually happened has become instead
a means for courts to make decisions about which "bad" people
deserve to be punished. Courts have thus manipulated causation-in-
fact into another proximate causation test. Such manipulation in
order to avoid the role of chance is inappropriate. Courts should
dispense with the causal question altogether (which they have
essentially done) and punish those who are morally blameworthy
rather than those whom can be proven to be the cause of the harm.
IV. TRANSFERRED INTENT: FURTHER CONTORTIONS TO
RULE OUT LUCK
A. Definition and Rationale
John shoots at Mary, intending to kill her. A strong gust of
wind causes the bullet to hit not Mary, but Jane. Is John guilty of
murdering Jane?
The answer is "yes" under the doctrine of transferred intent.
The doctrine of transferred intent, or the theory that the intention
"follows the bullet,"112 allows courts to hold criminals liable in
cases in which they miss their victim and hit another person or in
which they mistake someone for their victim."' The Model Penal
Code adopts this doctrine:
(2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an
element of an offense, the element is not established if the
actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of
the actor unless:
(a) the actual result differs from that designed or contem-
plated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a
different person or different property is injured or
affected or that the injury or harm designed or contem-
plated would have been more serious or more extensive
than that caused .... 14
case has not been met, the defendant is still being held liable.
112 State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 790 P.2d 287, 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
"3 See State v. Cantua-Ramirez, 718 P.2d 1030, 1032 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
114 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(a); see also id. § 2.03(3)(a) (dealing with recklessly
or negligently causing a particular result).
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The rationale for the transferred intent doctrine was clearly
expressed by the court in People v. Birreuta:"5
The function of the transferred intent doctrine is to insure the
adequate punishment of those who accidentally kill innocent
bystanders, while failing to kill their intended victims. But for the
transferred intent doctrine, such people could escape punishment
for murder, even though they deliberately and premeditatedly
killed-because of their "lucky" mistake. The transferred intent
doctrine is born of the sound judicial intuition that such a
defendant is no less culpable than a murderer whose aim is good.
It insures that such a defendant will not be allowed to defend
against a murder charge by claiming to have made a mistake of
identity, a poor aim or the like.1
6
B. Real Consequences of the Legal Fiction
Courts have recognized that "[t]ransferred intent is a legal
fiction, used to reach what is regarded with virtual unanimity as a
just result."" 7 What the courts have essentially done in these
cases is to rule out the role of luck. William Prosser notes that early
criminal cases were primarily concerned with wanting to hold
someone guilty for the crime."' After all, if the defendant did
not intend to kill the victim then the defendant is not guilty of
murder. Someone, however, clearly did murder the victim, and if
not the defendant, who? In seeking to avoid this conundrum,
courts fashioned the rule of transferred intent whereby the
defendant is not absolved of responsibility solely because she has
bad aim. Courts, however, have sacrificed a degree of intellectual
coherence in order to achieve this result.
' 208 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Ct. App. 1984).
n6 Id. at 638-39.
"1 People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Ct. App. 1988); see also William L.
Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEx. L. REV. 650, 650 (1967) (stating that transferred
intent is a "bare-faced fiction"). For a different approach to this problem, see
DRESSLER, supra note 44, at 108. Dressier argues that the mens rea element exists
even when John shoots Jane, rather than Mary as he intended, becauseJohn shoots
intending to kill a person and does so. Since the statute will only require thatJohn
shoot with intent to kill another person, and not a specific person,John has satisfied
the mens rea ele-ment for the murder; no transference is really necessary. Since
courts do not use this rationale, however, they are still contorting intentions in order
to rule out luck. This is similar to the problem previously presented with but-for
causation: NESS maybe the method to prove actual causation but the courts do not
use it. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
"8 See Prosser, supra note 117, at 653.
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1. Does Intent Transfer When the Intended Victim Is Killed?
In Birreuta, the defendant intended to kill only one woman,
but accidently killed his wife also."' The question before the
court was whether the doctrine of transferred intent applies to
unintended victims when the defendant succeeds in killing his
intended victim.1 2 The court concluded that the defendant was
guilty of murder with respect to the intended victim but only of
manslaughter with respect to the unintended victim:
1 21
[T]he interests ofjustice are best served by differentiating between
killers who premeditatedly and deliberately kill two people, and
killers who only intend to kill one person, and accidently kill
another. Both types should be punished for both killings, but the
former type is clearly more culpable.... If the transferred intent
doctrine is applicable when the intended victim is killed, this
difference disappears.
122
Hence, whether or not the defendant completes her crime against
her intended victim determines what crime she will be punished for
with regard to her unintended victim. It should be noted here that
courts are twisting the mental state of the defendant upon a mere
fortuity. Mental states-internal, pre-action dispositions-are being
determined after the fact based upon how good the defendant's aim
was.
We might decide that this is a small price to pay for the right
result. When a criminal tries to purposefully kill someone and
succeeds, she should be charged with murder. But what if the
defendant enters a shopping mall with the intent of killing her ex-
husband and, in order to accomplish this result, sprays machine-gun
fire throughout the mall and kills fifty people? If her ex-husband is
not included in this group, is she guilty of fifty murders? Or does
she only intend one murder, making her guilty of one murder and
forty-nine manslaughters?
Further, other courts have disagreed with Bireutta and have
held that the defendant's intent does transfer even when the
intended victim is also injured.123 According to such logic, the
"9 208 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 639.
122 Id.
12- See Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also
State v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez 790 P.2d 287, 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) ("Intent to
murder is transferable to each unintended victim once there is an attempt to kill
THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
woman in the previous example would be guilty of fifty murders.
In Mordica v. State, a Florida court agreed with the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that "[t]here are even
stronger grounds for applying the principle [doctrine of transferred
intent] where the intended victim is killed by the same act that kills
the unintended victim."124 What are these grounds? Why, when
our mall gunwoman is reckless as to fifty deaths, does she suddenly
become an intentional murderer of fifty people just because she
intends to kill one specific person? As Birreuta points out,
12 15
isn't there a moral difference between someone who intends to kill
fifty people and someone who intends to kill one-a distinction that
Mordica obscures?
2. When the Unintended Victim Is a Member of a
Protected Class
Transferred intent causes further problems when the unintend-
ed victim is in a protected class. What if A shoots at B, a regular
person, but misses and accidently kills C, a law enforcement officer?
If there is a statute that makes killing a law enforcement officer a
greater crime than killing a regular person, is A guilty of killing C as
a federal officer or killing C as a regular person? In Mordica, the
court opted for the latter alternative and held that the defendant's
intention to strike another inmate was all that was transferred when
the defendant's unintended victim was a law enforcement officer.
26
The same holding was reached by United States v. Montoya
127
where the defendant accidently hit a federal officer on the head
with his crutch while trying to knock a can of beer from the hand
of a companion. 28 The court reasoned that "[i]f the theory of
transferred intent were applied under section 111, an assault not
intentionally directed at a federal officer would become subject to
the augmented penalties merely because the blow happened by
chance to strike a federal officer. " 129 The defendant, therefore,
someone.").
124 618 So. 2d at 303 (quoting United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
125 See 208 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
126 See 618 So. 2d at 303 (noting that "battery of a law enforcement officer is a
specific intent crime requiring proof of intent to knowingly hit a law enforcement
officer").
127 739 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1984).
126 See id. at 1437.
12 Id. at 1438.
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is not found innocent by virtue of missing her intended victim, but
neither is she subjected to the misfortune of additional punishment
for having assaulted a member of a protected class.
The court in Montoya then attempted to distinguish United
States v. Feolat'3 by stating that "Feola intended to assault the
officer even though he (Feola) did not know that the victim was a
federal agent. Intent was not transferred from one victim to
another."'' Hence, when A shoots at B and hits C, the fact that C
is a federal officer is irrelevant because A did not know she was
going to hit C. Isn't the entire point of transferred intent, however,
to hold defendants responsible for victims they did not foresee?
Furthermore, if transferred intent makes intending to kill B the
same as intending to kill C, doesn't Feola apply when C happens to
be a federal officer?
3 2
Additionally, what if B is the federal officer? If intent transfers
and knowledge does not count according to Feola, then is A guilty
of killing a federal officer when she kills C? Here, the answer gets
confusing because: (1) A did not kill a federal officer; (2) under
mistake-of-fact rules she would be held to what she believed to be
the truth; but (3) Feola says the defendant did not need to know
that B was a federal agent to be guilty of killing one. Indeed, "the
severity of the offense predicated on the doctrine of transferred
intent is that applicable had the intended victim been the one
injured."' Under such reasoning, when A misses federal agent
B and kills C, A is guilty of murdering a federal officer. Thus, the
confusion created by the combination of Feola with the doctrine of
transferred intent is apparent.
Further, some courts are willing to charge the defendant with a
greater crime than the one the defendant intended to commit. In
State v. Cantua-Ramirez, ' the defendant intended to hit his
girlfriend but missed and hit their child, whom the girlfriend was
holding. 33 The court held that since the injury intended and the
IsO 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (holding that the defendant, although unaware that the
man he assaulted was an undercover federal agent, was responsible for violating the
federal statute).
"3 739 F.2d at 1439.
32 If there is a problem with holding A guilty of murdering a federal officer, the
glitch lies in the rationale behind Feola, not that behind the doctrine of transferred
intent. Any further discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
" Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301, 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134 718 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
s5 See id. at 1032-33.
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injury received were the same, and the sole difference was the
grading of the offense, the defendant was guilty of the greater
offense."3 6 This holding clearly conflicts with the rationale behind
the doctrine of transferred intent. Transferred intent was to
prevent culpable defendants from being charged with lesser crimes
or no crime at all. Offenders are supposed to be held guilty for the
degree of culpability that they manifest toward their intended
victims. A classification of a crime as a felony rather than as a
misdemeanor reflects the societal decision that a person who hits a
child is a worse person than a one who causes the same injury to an
adult. By convicting the defendant of child abuse, the court in
Cantua-Ramirez attributed to the defendant a culpability that he did
not have.
C. Conclusions
Legal fictions are occasionally needed for the law to reach the
correct result. The doctrine of transferred intent, however,
undermines logical coherence in its attempt to limit the role of
chance. Its purpose cannot be served when the intended victim is
actually injured or when the defendant is punished for a crime
greater than that which she committed. Further, unlike causal
overdetermination cases where policy decisions about causation are
affecting the causal question itself, here, problems with causation
are forcing twists in the concept of intention-a step courts should
be unwilling to take. Instead, the solution to evading fortuity lies
in getting rid of the problem, causation, and not in contorting other
legal concepts.
V. ATrEMPTS AND COMPLETED CRIMES: THE CONTINUING ROLE
OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Edith shoots at Frank intending to kill him, but Frank ducks.
Edith will be guilty of attempted murder. She is just as morally
blameworthy"3 7 as if she had succeeded, yet the criminal law
continues to maintain a distinction between attempts and completed
crimes.
138
"s See id. at 1033. The defendant was found guilty of intentional child abuse, a
class-four felony, rather than assault on an adult, a class-one misdemeanor.
137 See supra part I.B.
Even the Model Penal Code distinguishes between first degree felonies and
attempts to commit them. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (grading such attempts
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A. Defining Attempts and Justifying Their Punishment
According to the Model Penal Code, a person attempts a crime if,
acting with the culpability otherwise required for the commission
of the crime, he:
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the
crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of
causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without
further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the
circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned
to culminate in his commission of the crime.3
9
At common law, the definition of an attempt is an act coming close
to completion with the intent to complete the crime. 140  Most
states punish attempts less severely than completed crimes.
141
We punish attempts for two reasons. The first is that attempts
are sometimes seen as a harm in themselves since they may disrupt
society and create unrest. 142  Hence, these are activities which
deserve to be punished in their own right. 14  The second ratio-
nale is that if we want to prevent the harm that will result from a
successful attempt, we may want to intervene before the harm is
caused. 144
Although intervention does not necessarily entail punish-
ment, 14 5 retributivists will justify punishing attempters on the
grounds that once the actor has formed the intention to commit the
as felonies of the second degree). Thus, an attempt to commit murder is not
punished to the same extent as murder.
'39 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1).
140 See Commonwealth v. Peaslee 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901) (focusing on
"whether the defendant's acts [came] near enough to the accomplishment of the
substantive offense to be punishable").
141 See DRESSLER, supra note 44, at 331; Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1498.
142 See Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1506 (arguing that "attempt itself upsets the
social equilibrium, giving rise to a certain tension or disorder").
14' This type of harm, however, may be seen as a free-floating evil that does not
create a setback to any individual's interest. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 20-25 (1988) (presenting various examples of free-floating evils).
144 See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 727 (arguing that the "protective or preventive
function of the criminal law" justifies intervention before harm is caused).
145 See id. at 735 (arguing that "to justify intervention ... is not to justify
punishment").
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crime and has completed a substantial enough step to manifest her
culpability, she is just as culpable as if she had completed the
crime.146 Utilitarians will also want to punish before completion
because it will increase deterrence 147 while decreasing the
disutility caused by the harmful result.
B. The Argument in Favor of Equivalence
4s
1. Some Preliminaries
Before beginning an analysis of the arguments in favor of
treating attempts and completed crimes the same, it is helpful to set
some ground rules. We should first distinguish attempts from
completed crimes.'49 A completed crime is a successful attempt:
John, with intent to kill, shot at Mary; the bullet hit Mary; Mary
died. There are then both completed attempts and incomplete
attempts. A completed attempt is where the actor has done
everything in his power to effectuate his desired results: John, with
intent to kill, shot at Mary; the bullet missed Mary; Mary lived. An
incomplete attempt is where the actor has not done the last act
necessary to complete the crime: John pointed the gun at Mary and
shouted, "I am going to kill you"; the police then burst through the
door. For the moment, let us address only the difference between
a completed crime and a completed attempt.
Sverdlik set some other guidelines that would also be helpful to
follow here. First, we are evaluating the difference between an
attempt and a success "other things being equal."5 ' Otherwise,
if we allowed other variables to change, we would not be sure what
146 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 131 (1968); Ashworth,
supra note 42, at 736 (discussing the "intent principle" under which "individuals
should be held criminally liable for what they intended to do" regardless of the
result).
1
1 7 See Shavell, supra note 50, at 457 ("If punishment were restricted to those who
actually did harm, deterrence would be inadequate.").
1' I have borrowed this term from Steven Sverdlik, Crime and Moral Luck, in
MORAL LUCK 181, 182 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). Although Sverdlik is using
"equivalence theory" to address the similarity of moral culpability despite different
results, I am applying the similarity to the treatment of attempts versus completed
crimes in law.
9 See R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABILITY 185-86 (1990)
(discussing differences between different types of attempts); Schulhofer, supra note
46, at 1506 (distinguishing completed crimes, completed attempts, and incomplete
attempts).
"5 Sverdlik, supra note 148, at 182.
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is doing the moral work, the difference between attempts and
successes or the other altered variables. 51 Next, we are assuming
that a success produces more harm than an attempt although
attempts may produce some harm.152 If attempts and completed
crimes were assumed to cause the same amount of harm, the
distinction between the two, based on the occurrence of a harm,
would disappear. Finally, the only harm we are talking about for
the time being is death. 5
2. Results Do Not Matter
In arguing that our intuitive judgments do not necessarily yield
the conclusion that completers are worse than attempters, Steven
Schulhofer presents the following hypothetical:
Suppose that A, who intended to kill at the time he shot, suddenly
decides he has done a terrible thing, immediately calls a hospital
for help, has the country's best neurosurgeon flown in from a
great distance to perform the operation, and does all else in his
power to save his wife. In spite of everything, she dies. B
meanwhile does everything possible to prevent his wounded wife
from being discovered or treated. But neighbors have heard the
shot, the police get her to the hospital in time, and she recovers.
Is A still more culpable than B?54
One might argue that Schulhofer is stacking the deck. Assuming
evaluating moral culpability is an additive process, the difference in
intent may be doing the work in this hypothetical. For instance, B's
culpability could be measured as -1 (for the small amount of harm
resulting) + (plus) -30 (for his incredibly evil intentions) = -31. A, on
the other hand, may have caused a great evil, -20, but his intentions
were eventually good +3 = -17. Hence, the amount of harm caused
could still be relevant, it is just because the intentions of A so
outweigh any other considerations that the result seems unfair.
Schulhofer is violating the preliminaries Sverdlik set out by not
holding other things equal in order to show that at times the harm
resulting does not matter.
" Variables that might be altered include motive and provocation, both of which
pull moral strings. See id.
152 See id. at 182-83.
15 See id. at 183.
"4 Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1515.
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A simpler, less contrived hypothetical is presented by R.A. Duff:
Pat andJill each fire a shot at an intended victim, intending to kill
her: Jill succeeds in killing her victim, but Pat does not (her victim
moves and the shot misses). Is there any difference between their
two cases which can justify the distinction which the law draws
between them, such that Jill is sentenced to life imprisonment for
murder, whereas Pat receives a lighter sentence for attempted
murder?155
The answer should be "no." After all, the difference between Pat
and Jill is luck. And luck is something upon which true responsibil-
ity should not depend.'56 Both Pat and Jill intended to kill their
victims, and thus, the mens rea element for murder is met. Both
also put their intentions into action when they fired their guns, and
hence the actus reus element is met. Why should criminal liability
then rely on matters out of the agents' control?
157
"' DUFF, supra note 149, at 184.
' SeeJOEL FEINBERG, Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals, in DOING AND
DESERVING 25, 33 (1970) (arguing that "moral responsibility is... restricted to the
inner world of the mind, where... luck has no place"); HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF
CRIMINALJUSTICE 423-24 (1979) (arguing that when "the nonoccurrence of harm is
purely fortuitous" the punishment should not be lessened); Lawrence C. Becker,
Criminal Attempt and the Theoy of the Law of Crimes, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 262-76
(1974) (arguing that the person who accidentally misses her target is "no less a social
menace"); Richard Parker, Blame, Punishmen4 and the Role of Result, 21 AM. PHIL. Q.
269-70 (1984) (arguing that "it is false that results are generally relevant to either
one's blameworthiness or his punishability"); Michael Zimmerman, Luck and Moral
Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374, 385 (1987) (arguing that "[i]nsofar as what happens
after one has made a free decision is... up to nature, then these events are strictly
dispensable in the assessment of moral responsibility").
5 There are other instances, besides attempts, where luck plays a part in the
criminal law. James Gobert points to the fact that if there is an intervening cause, the
defendant will not be held guilty although she has manifested her culpability. See
James J. Gobert, The Fortuity of Consequence, 4 CRIM. L.F. 1, 7 (1993). Further,
medical negligence in the treatment of the victim should not affect the culpability of
the defendant. See id. at 9. The year-and-a-day rule (that the victim must die within
a year and a day of the defendant's commission of the actus reus) allows chance to
determine the defendant's crime. If the victim dies a year later, the defendant is a
murderer; if the victim dies a year and two days later, the defendant is merely an
attempted murderer. See id. at 18. Luck may also work unfairly against a defendant.
Under the thin-skull rule, the defendant takes her victim as she finds her. Hence, a
defendant might find herself guilty for more than she intended. See id. at 8-9. This
poses the same problem as transferred intent: it holds defendants guilty for
outcomes toward which they did not have a guilty mind. These problems are also
presented in cases of felony-murder where the defendant is held accountable for
murder for any death which occurs while she is committing a felony. See id. at 18-19.
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C. The Argument That Results Do Matter
Despite the prevalence of fortuity in attempt law, some
commentators continue to argue that the fortuitous result of the
creation of a harm is relevant.
1. No Harm, No Reason to Punish
One possible argument in favor of results is that no harm has
occurred and thus we do not have a reason to punish the defen-
dant.' The rationale, however, for punishing may be different
than the rationale for initially criminalizing the conduct. Although
the original justification for criminalizing murder is that it causes a
harm to others, we do criminalize and punish inchoate crimes
also.1 59 We, as a society, have made the decision to punish acts
that will eventually cause a harm even though the harm does not
result in that particular case.
2. Fear of Jury Nullification
Another argument in favor of nonequivalence is that if we
punish attempts the same as completed crimes, juries will not
convict. Schulhofer extensively addresses the research in this area
and concludes that such a fear is unfounded.' Ashworth, on the
other hand, still maintains that this is a practical possibility which
should be kept in mind. 6 '
Several things about jury nullification should be noted. First,
Ashworth's concern about the practical possibility is just that-a
practical question. To a retributivist, the possibility of disutility is
not a reason not to punish (although the answer might be different
if jury nullification threatened our ability ever to punish such
wrongdoers.) Further, jurors are not addressing the fairness of the
range of sentencing. Before them is one criminal, and jurors will
1- See HUSAK, supra note 45, at 15 (explaining that some theorists find conduct
which does not cause harm to be preparation and thus not punishable). For a
comprehensive definition of harm, see generallyJOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS
(1984). But see Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 104-13, on file with the author) (critiquing
Feinberg's conception of harm).
"9 See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for
punishing attempts).
'" See Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1522-33, 1554-57.
161 See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 749 (arguing that jury nullification is a
"practical possibility which must be borne in mind").
THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
react to the culpability of that person. Unlike cases of strict liability
which jurors may feel are unfair, the culpability of the actor will be
sufficient to sway the typical juror.
1 62
3. With Attempts, Less Punishment Suffices to Satisfy
the Retaliatory Urge
Another argument that results should matter is that our
retaliatory urge is greater when harm occurs. 6 ' After all, how does
one apply "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" if all John did
was make an attempt at the eye? This argument presupposes a
system of punishment based on retaliation. As Schulhofer notes,
however, most jurisdictions do not invoke retaliation as a reason to
punish, and "legal theorists are virtually unanimous in applauding
the judgment."'"
4. We Want Society to Take Murders Seriously
Society, it is argued, learns what is good and bad by looking at
the law. 16 If we teach people that murder and attempted murder
are equally wrong, then people will not take a murder as seriously
when it happens.1
66
This argument rests on two faulty assumptions. The first is that
punishing people equally for trying to kill and killing means the
world is no different when someone lives as opposed to when some-
one dies. This is simply not true. The actor whom we punish is no
different, but the death of a human being necessarily takes its toll.
Society is intelligent enough to recognize the difference between (1)
equating people who try and people who succeed in doing a bad
thing (punishing attempts the same as completions) and (2)
equating the gravity of the harm that occurs when a murderer does
succeed to the absence of harm when she does not (recognizing the
difference when a harm occurs and when it does not).
The second faulty assumption is that by punishing attempts and
162 On these points, see Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1526 (suggesting that moral
fault may be enough for juries in most cases).
163 See ADAM SMrrH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 100 (A. Macfie & D. Raphael
eds., 1976).
" Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1510-11. But see DRESSLER, supra note 44, at 338
(using severity of the harm as an indicator for the degree of punishment necessary
under retributive theory).
1's For an analysis of law's educative role, see FEINBERG, supra note 143, 294-300.
166 See DUFF, supra note 149, at 191.
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murders the same, society will begin to feel that murders are not as
bad-that they are just like attempts. To understand the crux of this
argument, imagine two people, Lady and Loser. Lady is a member
of high society and everyone in town loves and respects her. Loser,
on the other hand, is uncultured and despised. If Lady and Loser
were seen around town together, what would happen? The argu-
ment that associating attempted murders with murders will
undermine the gravity with which murder is perceived is the
equivalent of assuming that Lady will be compromised by her
association with Loser. This argument ignores the possibility that
Loser's reputation might be enhanced by her association with Lady.
Indeed, if society truly respected Lady, it might conclude that
perhaps Loser was not such a loser after all.
Murder is condemned by all of society. If attempt begins to be
associated with murder, people will not necessarily think that
murder is somehow less grave because it is only punished as an
attempt. Rather, people will respect that attempt, too, is a serious
crime because it is being punished to the same degree as murder.
5. Deterrence: Differential Punishments Create an Incentive to
Stop After Attempters Have Already Begun the Act
Another argument advanced for treating completions differently
from attempts is that otherwise, once the actor has taken a substan-
tial step, she has no reason not to finish the intended conduct.167
Indeed, imagine the case of Cara who shoots at David. Cara misses.
If she is going to be held guilty of murder, what incentive does she
have not to shoot again and finish him off? As noted by Schulhofer
and Ashworth, 6 ' however, abandonment is a defense to attempt
under the Model Penal Code.'6 9 Further, the actor's wavering
over whether to complete the crime will call into question whether
she has the sufficient mens rea. 70 Evidence concerning mens rea
becomes more necessary the more remote the conduct is from its
167 Note that the same punishment for completed unsuccessful attempters and
successful attempters will do very little to decrease deterrence since most completed
attempters were planning to succeed. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. 4, at 134
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
1 See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 740; Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1520.
169 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4).
17o But see Paul R. Hoeber, The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other
Problems of Temporal Individuation, 74 CAL. L. REV. 377, 398-400 (1986) (arguing that
abandonment "confirms rather than refutes the existence of the requisite intent").
THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
completion." Finally, how far the actor was willing to go may
mitigate or enhance the severity of the punishment.
17 2
6. Attempters Do Not Benefit in the Same Way
Some theorists have argued that when the criminal only attempts
the crime, she does not receive the fruits of her activities. 73 This
argument amounts to one of unjust enrichment. When a criminal
succeeds, she is unjustly enriched, which must be rectified; when she
fails, this added element of punishment is unnecessary. Ashworth
finds this argument unsatisfactory: "At bottom, it must be said that
the principles of profit deprivation and vindicative satisfaction
belong to a separate realm of principles ancillary to punishment-
chiefly principles of compensation."
i7 4
Indeed, whether someone benefits from a crime is not the crimi-
nal law's concern. The criminal law's focus is only on deterring
others and punishing violators. Thus, if Ken kills Renee and
afterward feels no happiness, he cannot argue that since he derived
no pleasure from the murder, he should not be punished. Others
will still be deterred from committing the crime by looking at the
example of his punishment, Ken will be less likely to kill again
(specific deterrence), and Ken is a bad person who chose to violate
the law and thus deserves to be punished.
7. Attempters Are Not As Dangerous
Nonequivalence theorists also maintain that attempters are not
as dangerous as completers. The failure to complete the act may be
due to a lack of fixity of purpose;'75 however, even if attempters
and completers were punished equally, this lack of success could
then have evidentiary weight as to mens rea. 176 Further, only a
small minority of people would truly be less dangerous, evinced by
171 We need this evidence because the act itself may be equivocal.
17 See Shavell, supra note 50, at 455 (discussing how varying sanctions for the
second attempt can create incentives not to try again if the first attempt has failed).
175 See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 744-45; Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less
Punishment than Completed Crimes, 5 LAW & PHIL. 1, 28-29 (1986).
1" Ashworth, supra note 42, at 746.
'75 See id. at 743-44.
176 But see infra part VI.B (arguing that results have little evidentiary weight in
determining intent).
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their continual failure.
177
Paul Rothstein maintains that results are necessary to show
dangerousness. He argues that there are differences between (1) a
gunman who buys a gun but never gets near his intended victim, (2)
the gunman who pulls the trigger but death is prevented by the
gun's malfunctioning or the victim's wearing a bulletproof vest, and
(3) the gunman who kills his victim. 178 The first gunman's mens
rea, according to Rothstein, is uncertain. 17 Although this state-
ment may be true, the criminal law already accommodates this
reality by imposing a "substantial step" definition of an act and by
requiring the prosecution to prove the mens rea of purpose.
Rothstein further argues the second gunman may have taken the
gun's misfiring or the victim's vest into account and so "he can take
credit for these 'chance' circumstances in the world that are
supposedly 'outside his control.'"'8 ° But doesn't any credit he
takes serve as evidence of mens rea? If I fire a gun at Dick, knowing
he is wearing a bulletproof vest or knowing my gun misfires, do
(can?) I have the purpose of killing him? What if I know there is
about a seventy-five percent chance that Dick is wearing his vest or
that the gun will misfire? Doesn't my knowledge of these factors
and how I attempt to accommodate them go to my intentions and
not to causation? What I knew beforehand has no influence on the
world as we know it once I have acted, and what I did to prepare for
what I knew is part of my action and mental state.
8. No Harm, No Foul
One response to the equivalence argument is the intuitive sense
that a person deserves less punishment when no harm occurs.
Smith argues that if one of his sons throws a stone at the dining
room window and misses, he will be angry, but if the window is
broken, he will be furious.' Rothstein discusses this "feeling" in
addressing a hypothetical presented by Judith Thomson:
182
1" See Ashworth supra note 42, at 743 (citing Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1586-
93).
178 See Paul F. Rothstein, Causation in Torts, Crimes, and Moral Philosophy: A Reply
to Professor Thomson, 76 GEO. L.J. 151, 160-61 (1987).
'7 See id. at 161.
'"'Id. (emphasis omitted).
1 See Smith, supra note 19, at 71.
182 SeeJudith J. Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 CEO. L.J. 137, 144 (1987).
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She sets out the example of the person who, by idly tapping his
foot on the sidewalk, saves three lives through some freak of
nature unknown to him. Professor Thomson says that our
judgment of the morality of the foot tapping-neutral morality-is
unaffected by the good result. I would say that people, particular-
ly those saved, would feel very kindly disposed toward such a
person, at least more so than toward a foot tapper who did not
wind up saving anyone.
s1 8
If Rothstein proves anything with this assertion, it is just how
different feelings can be. How can we base a criminal justice system
on feelings that vary from person to person?1 4
Further, the reason "it just matters" may be socially trained, and
therefore reversible in future generations. Imagine a young child,
Johnny, who has taken a crayon and written on the walls of his
house. When his parents discover this defacement, a typical
parental response is going to be "LOOK AT WHAT YOU HAVE
DONE!" (Note the emphasis on results.) The parents may only
secondarily inquire into "what were you thinking?" Johnny
associates the reasons for his punishment with the harm he has
caused. 
1 5
The situation might be different forJohnny if he only attempted
to write on the walls. If his little sister, Mary, ran up and took the
crayon from him right before he started writing, Johnny would
never get to write on the walls.' Johnny would first learn that
results are the key to discovery. Chances are, Johnny's parents will
never even discover his culpable intentions. Even if Johnny is
discovered, however, the punishment inflicted will typically not be
as severe as if he had written on the wall."8 Johnny will not learn
'8 Rothstein, supra note 178, at 159-60.
"8 See Ashworth,supra note 42, at 748-49; David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves
Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 54 (1989).
8' See RICHARD E. PETrY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, ATTrrUDES AND PERSUASION:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 40-52 (1981) (discussing how attitudes can
be conditioned).
18 Indeed, isJohnny less of a "bad boy" if he is somehow prevented from writing
on the walls? What if he cannot find his crayons, but he is just dying to color the
living room wall blue? What if he meant to write on the bedroom wall, but writes on
the kitchen wall? What if the walls have crayon-proof paint? What if he meant to use
a green crayon but accidently grabbed a blue one? Isn'tJohnnyjust as culpable as
if he had achieved his desired goal?
"" The parents will distinguish between the two acts because they were taught that
results matter. Further, in reply to Smith, when a harm is caused by a child, the
parents are reacting not only in response to society's decision that a bad action has
occurred, but also as individuals who will now have to spend time and money to
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until much later, when he goes to law school (and by then he will be
John), that we punish because of the culpable intentions of the actor
and the choice the actor has made to act on those intentions. In
both the crayon-interception case and the successful-writing case,
Johnny is the same child who decided to disobey his parents and do
a bad thing. If his parents emphasized those factors to him at an
early age, the societal emphasis on results could disappear.
9. An Alternative Descriptive Theory
Some commentators have argued not only that fortuity does play
a role in the law but also that it should. In his Note, Daniel Mandil
argues that chance separates paradigmatic from nonparadigmatic
crimes."' The paradigmatic crime involves an intentional act and
the creation of a harm (such as a death).18 9  A crime is
nonparadigmatic if one of the elements is missing: an attempt is an
intended crime without a harm and criminal negligence is a
negligent (nonintended) act with harm. 9 ° Mandil further notes
that no liability is created by a negligent act that does not result in
harm.' 91  Mandil sees these separations as a balance struck
between an individual's freedom of action and the sphere in which
the state must necessarily interfere. 92 He argues that:
In the context of harm without intent, the uncontroversial absence
of tort liability for uneventful acts of negligence demonstrates the
complete dominance of the value of freedom of action over
competing social values....
Like tort law, in cases of criminal negligence, the criminal law
generally preserves the supremacy of freedom over other social
values-only the existence of isolated reckless endangerment
statutes disturbs the congruence
9 3
remedy the problem. Results may matter more in an individual case than in the case
of societal decisions. We still incur the costs and inconvenience of putting the
attempter through the criminal justice system. The parents of the victim, however,
may see a distinct difference between someone who succeeds in killing their daughter
and someone who tries and misses. They may feel both are bad people and should
be punished to the full extent of the law, but the results of a near miss are very
relevant to them.
' See Daniel M. Mandil, Note, Chance, Freedom, and Criminal Liability, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 125, 125 (1987).
189 See id. at 137.
'90 See id.
191 See id. at 138.
9 See id. at 140.
193 Id. at 139-40 (citation omitted).
THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Mandil, however, is missing the point. He sees the scarcity of
criminal-negligence-without-resulting-harm statutes as defeating the
arguments suggesting that the resulting harm should not matter in
the criminal law."' A descriptive theory may show what the law
is currently doing, but it fails to show why this is what the law
should be doing. The lack of endangerment laws only illustrates
that the criminal law is failing to realize that it is taking fortuity into
account-it does not justify doing so.
VI. SHOULD CAUSATION PLAY ANY ROLE?
A. Yes, in Tort Law
In arguing that results matter, Rothstein presents the example
that supposes that all truckers fail to maintain their brakes. A child
runs out in front of two trucks and is hit by one of them. Does it
matter which one hit the child? Indeed, if results do not matter,
Rothstein argues, then it does not matter if we can prove which
trucker hit the child. 19 5
Results do matter here, however, and the reason is simple. One
goal of tort law, unlike criminal law, is corrective justice, 196 re-
dressing the injury inflicted upon the victim by the faulty defen-
dant.' 9 Hence, who is injured is very relevant, as is who did the
injuring.
"0 Further, the rationale for according liability in tort law is not necessarily
congruent with the rationale for criminal law; hence, not holding people criminally
liable does not necessarily follow from arguments that they are not liable under tort
law. See also infra notes 195-97 (arguing that resulting harm should still play a role
in tort liability).
195 See Rothstein, supra note 178, at 165.
' But see Emily Sherwin, Why Is CorrectiveJusticeJust?, 15 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
839, 847-48 (1992) (arguing that corrective justice, itself, can only be justified on
consequential grounds and that it, too, presents problems of moral luck).
197 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79-81 (1946) (stating that a
defendant would have to redress the injury because of the consequences of the
defendant's act); Wright, supra note 81, at 1004. Wright states:
[T]ort law traditionally has been viewed as a system of corrective justice
based on individual autonomy and individual responsibility. Individuals who
tortiously expose the person or property of others to injury ordinarily are
required to compensate those others if and only if injury actually occurs as
a result of the tortious behavior.
Id. (citations omitted).
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B. As Evidence of Mens Rea?
Practically, results serve a number of functions. First, without
them, we will not know about some attempts' 9 8 They may further
serve as more evidence of mens rea. Thomson's foot tapper,
according to Rothstein, will be praised for his conduct because the
results are viewed as a good heuristic guide to his intentions.
99
Results serve as confirmation that criminals purposely committed
their crimes.
Is this really true? Suppose that I am drinking a glass of red
wine at Sue's party. Lisa, my arch-enemy, dressed in all white, is
about to come over and say hello. When I spill the wine on her, is
her new red dress indicative of my intentions? You may infer that
I intended to ruin her dress from two facts: (1) you know I dislike
her and (2) I spilled my wine when she approached me. How much
of your decision is based on the fact that her white dress is now red?
If, instead, I spilled wine on the floor only inches away from
Lisa, would you think I intended to spill it any less because it did
not hit her? Clearly, the result is not indicative of my inten-
tions.
20 0
C. Cases Where Otherwise We May Be Punishing for Thoughts?
1. Completed Versus Incomplete Attempts
Continuing with Lisa and her "new" red dress, what if out of the
corner of your eye you saw my hand start to tip, as if I were going
to spill the wine, but then Joe, another guest, alerts me to the tip,
and I then return my glass to an upright position? What were my
intentions at the point where my hand started to turn? Should I be
held responsible as if I had stained her dress?
Ashworth argues that incomplete attempts should be punished
19' See Rothstein, supra note 178, at 157.
199 See id. at 160 (stating that lives saved by one foot tapper make it more probable
that the tapper took into account the possibility of saving lives).
" Another example is that of my firing a gun at Lisa. First, assume that I fire the
gun directly at her, but the bullet misses and lands in a tree. Next, assume I point
the gun in the air and the bullet bounces off the tree and into Lisa. Which indicates
my intentions: the result (where the bullet lands) or the act (where I point the gun)?
But see People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942, 949 (Cal. 1968) (noting that manner of
killing may be evidence of premeditation); Gobert, supra note 157, at 20-21 (arguing
that when a gun is fired at point-blank range, where it lands (such as the victim's arm
or the victim's heart) is indicative of the defendant's intentions).
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less severely than completed attempts for this very reason:
We cannot tell whether he would have abandoned his attempt of
his own accord, if he had been left undisturbed. Bearing in mind
Blackstone's view that it takes greater "nerve" to carry a plan
through to its final stage, this argument strengthens the general
case for reduced punishments for incomplete attempts.
20'
Currently, however, we punish completed and incomplete attempts
equally. Further, the question here is simply one of actus reus. We
want to ensure that the act requirement is sufficiently proximate to
the harm. Buying a gun may not be a substantial enough step to
show fixity of purpose, but loading it and waiting for the victim to
return home is.20 2 Where cases are close enough, jurors may be
unable to find that the defendant had the mens rea to commit the
crime. On the other hand, once we have determined what a
substantial step is, the same reasons which support punishing
attempts the same as completed crimes apply to these cases.
20 3
2. Inherently Impossible Attempts
Jane hates Barbie and believes that if she tears the head off a
Barbie doll, it will kill Barbie. Is Jane guilty of attempted murder?
The Model Penal Code allows for mitigation where the conduct "is
so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the commission of
a crime that neither such conduct nor the actor presents a public
danger warranting the grading of such offense."
20 4
While some commentators view this as just, others worry about
whether the defendant's actions still manifest a criminality about
which we should be concerned.0 5 Several points should be made.
First, without this provision in the Model Penal Code, the possibility
of jury nullification is increased. How many jurors are willing to
give Jane a life sentence? Moreover, Jane's rationality may be
impaired if she believes that her actions will actually kill Barbie.
We also fear that punishing for a mistake of fact is too close to
201 Ashworth, supra note 42, at 741.
22 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2)(a) (stating that lying in wait may be a
substantial step).
20. See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 735-38 (discussing intent-based retributive and
consequentialist theory as supporting the punishment of completed and incomplete
crimes equally).
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(2).
205 See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 763 (discussing J.C. Smith, Attempts, Impossibility
and the Test of Rational Motivation, 1984 AUCKLAND L. REV. 25, 37).
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punishing for thoughts. If I shoot at a tree stump, how will anyone
know whether I thought it was a person or not? Ashworth discusses
the fear that the police and prosecutors will create crimes based on
intent with no foundation in acts. ° 8 But he concludes that this
practical concern may be met with practical remedies: better
supervision of the police and prosecutors, taped interviews, and
better definitions of the act requirement.
20 7
Despite these concerns, when someone has manifested that she
is willing to act on her evil intentions, she is morally blameworthy.
The fact that it is inherently impossible for her actions to yield her
desired results makes her no less blameworthy, no less
deterrable, 20 8 and no less of an example to deter others.
D. Crimes That Require a Mens Rea of Only Negligence
or Recklessness?
The argument for treating attempted murder and murder
equally may be compelling. But are we prepared to extend this
rationale so as to punish every negligent driver for manslaughter?
Recall Smith's hypothetical where the father keeps weedkiller in a
lemonade bottle. This weedkiller looks like lemonade, and the
lemonade label is still on the bottle. He leaves it within the easy
reach of his young children who love lemonade. 20 9 Depending
upon whether the children see it or not, he may or may not be
guilty of manslaughter. Once again, luck has entered into the
picture.
206 See Ashworth, supra note 42, at 759.
207 See id. at 760.
21 See David D. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective Probability, and Punishment for
Attempts, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 179,180-83 (1991) (arguing that punishing for impossible
attempts does serve as a deterrent). But see Shavell, supra note 50, at 451 (arguing
that when the probability of social harm is zero, there is no reason for society to bear
the costs of punishing someone whose act could never cause a harm).
Further, there is no evidence that the next timejane tries to kill Barbie it will not
be by a more effective method: "If at first you don't succeed .... " Friedman notes
that
One of the things we learn from a correct knowledge of causality (at least
under an efficient legal system) is that killing people may well cause us to
be punished. People who do not understand causality may fail to perceive
that relation. If so, they will attempt more murders than would more
rational people-and eventually they may give up on voodoo and use poison
instead.
Id. at 185; see also Shavell, supra note 50, at 451 (noting the same possibility of
escalation).
209 See Smith, supra note 19, at 65-66.
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According to the previously presented argument, the father
should be punished for the harm he negligently risked because fate
should not determine his culpability. He committed a negligent act;
he should pay for it. Smith, however, hesitates to convict for
manslaughter, even in cases where the defendant was reckless:
Suppose that a driver, X, overtakes on the brow of a hill when he
cannot see whether anything is coming in the opposite direction.
If anything were coming, there certainly would be a crash and,
obviously, someone might be killed. But nothing is coming and no
harm is done. Certainly X ought to be convicted of dangerous
driving; but to convict him of attempted murder would be rather
startling. Yet there is evidence that he was reckless as to whether
he caused the death and if recklessness is indistinguishable in law
from intention, there is equally evidence that he was guilty of
attempted murder.
21 0
What Smith fails to realize is that attempt is a crime of true
purpose.21 ' How can one purposely try to be reckless as to
someone's death? What X is guilty of is reckless driving and that is
the crime for which he will be convicted. Reckless driving, however,
will have the same degree of punishment as manslaughter and, if the
driving were extremely reckless, murder.212 We are not attribut-
ing to the defendant a mental state he does not have. We are
merely punishing him for the results that he has risked causing.
210 Id. at 73.
211 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (defining three types of attempts, all
requiring a purposeful mental state).
212 Where the actor manifests "extreme indifference to the value of human life,"
he may also be held guilty of murder. Id. § 210.2(1)(b). Because this person cares
so little about human life, we hold him guilty of the greater crime. If the defendant
engages in such conduct, for example, driving a car at 120 miles per hour, and is ar-
rested, his charge is still reckless driving, although had he hit someone he would be
charged with murder. We cannot say he attempted to murder someone because to
do so is to say that his conscious object was to be extremely indifferent to human life.
Glanville Williams presents the example of a defendant who is throwing stones
at a window in hopes of breaking it. See Glanville Williams, The Problem of Reckless
Attempts, 1983 CRiM. L. REv. 365, 366. The defendant knows that there are people
nearby, and that he might accidentally hit one of them. See id. He is thus reckless
as to hitting a person. See id. We would not say, however, that he is attempting to
hit a person because what he is attempting to do is break the window. "Attempts go
with objects, aims and purposes, not with collateral risks." Id.; cf. Joshua Sachs, Is
Attempt to Commit Voluntary Manslaughtera Possible Crime?, 71 ILL. BJ. 166, 170 (1982)
(arguing that one can attempt to commit manslaughter in cases of provocation by
noting that "[i]t is the inability to restrain an unlawful intent, not inability to form the
intent in the first place, which is the true hallmark of heat-of-passion manslaughter").
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VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Leave the Crimes, Alter the Punishment
One solution to the problems discussed above would be to leave
the definitions of the crimes alone, but arrange for the punishments
to be the same for attempts (or reckless and negligent endanger-
ments) as for their completed counterparts. Thus, someone who
purposefully engaged in an act that resulted in death would be
punished for murder, and someone who purposefully engaged in an
act which, by mere chance, did not result in a death would be
punished for attempted murder. Both, however, would serve the
same sentence. Would this solution resolve any of the problems
that exist under the current regime?21 s Applying the solution to
these problems would yield the following results.
1. Causal Overdetermination
Betty and Carla both shoot at Alex at the same time. Alex dies.
In such a case, the court will have to make a decision as to what test
it will use to determine causation-in-fact. Under the but-for test,
neither Betty nor Carla is the cause-in-fact (an odd result) but both
will be guilty of attempted murder and punished to the same degree
as if they had succeeded. Under NESS, both would be necessary
elements of a sufficient set of what actually happened-Betty was a
necessary element of the set that includes only Betty and vice versa.
Thus, both are guilty of murder.
2. Transferred Intent
Alice shoots at Betty but hits Carla. Carla dies. Alice is guilty
of manslaughter for killing Carla as well as attempted murder as
toward Betty. The attempted crime would be punished more
severely than the manslaughter charge. If Betty is a law enforce-
ment officer, Alice is liable for attempting to kill a law enforcement
officer (a greater crime than regular murder) and for manslaughter
as to Carla.214 If Carla is a law enforcement officer, Alice is liable
"' See supra parts III-VI (analyzing hypotheticals that illustrate current problems
of causal overdetermination, transferred intent, attempts, intervening acts, the thin-
skull rule, and recklessness).
214 See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (holding that a defendant could
be charged for assaulting a federal agent even though he did not know his intended
victim was a federal agent). Feola would yield the result that Alice is liable for
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for attempting to murder Betty and for the manslaughter of a law
enforcement officer.215 Further, if Alice hits both Betty and Carla,
Alice is guilty of murder as to Betty and manslaughter as to Carla.
3. Attempts
Alice shoots at Betty but misses. Alice is guilty of attempted
murder and is punished to the same degree as if she had completed
the crime.
4. Intervening Actors
Alice is about to pull the trigger when Carla grabs the gun and
shoots Betty herself. Carla is guilty of murder. Alice is guilty of
attempted murder. Both are punished equally.
5. Thin-Skull Rule
Alice punches Betty. Because of a preexisting head injury, Betty
dies. Assuming no reasonable person would expect such a reaction,
since Alice only intended to assault Betty, she is guilty solely of
assault.
6. Recklessness
Alex, Bob, Carl, and Dave all bring their machine guns to the
mall and open fire in the middle of Bloomingdale's. Alex hits only
one person in the arm, causing minor injuries. Bob kills one
person. Carl kills fifty people. Dave hits no one. Alex would be
guilty of assault as to the person he hit as well as reckless endanger-
ment for the many lives he risked. Bob is guilty of manslaughter.
Carl is guilty of fifty counts of manslaughter. Dave is guilty of
reckless endangerment.
The difficulty here is how to punish them. They have all done
the same bad act with the same evil intention. But how can a
attempting to murder a law enforcement officer even without Alice's knowledge of
that status. This would thus solve the earlier dilemma of how A should be punished
when she intended to hit B, whom she did not know was a law enforcement officer,
but misses and hits C.
"' This assumes that Feola still applies. Ultimately, it will be a legislative decision
how to punish the manslaughter of a law enforcement officer. Note, however, that
Alice's conviction for attempting to murder Betty as a law enforcement officer would
be punished to the same degree as a conviction for murdering Betty, a law enforce-
ment officer.
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charge of manslaughter, a charge of reckless endangerment, and
fifty counts of manslaughter all receive the same degree of punish-
ment?
This question may have an answer. First, note that Alex, Bob,
Carl, and Dave are not engaging in this activity together (assuming
they were would bring in complicated issues of conspiracy and
accomplice liability). Alex will go before ajudge and jury, and they
will see a person who is willing to open fire in the middle of a mall,
not someone who caused minor injuries, and he will be punished
severely for doing so. Carl will also go before ajudge and jury, and
he too will be punished severely for his actions. Alex and Carl will
not be tried at the same time and compared. The problem is that
once the two are juxtaposed, it seems that the harm Carl caused
somehow distinguishes his case from Alex's. We must remember,
however, that Carl is no more or less culpable than Dave. Indeed,
even if Alex and Carl were presented before the same judge and
jury, there is no reason why Alex's reckless endangerment would
receive a less severe penalty than Carl's manslaughter-the jury
would see two very dangerous people and react accordingly.
B. Endangerment Statutes
As an alternate solution, James Gobert recommends the
wholesale abolition of result crimes in favor of definitions that
include only actions and mental states-murder statutes would thus
become endangerment statutes.1 6 Such a statute would define the
crime solely as the act of endangering life with either purposeful,
knowing, reckless, or negligent intent.217 Gobert notes that such a
statute is already in place in New Zealand.21" This solution would
yield the following results.
216 See Gobert, supra note 157, at 16-17.
217 See id. at 16.
211 See id. at 17. New Zealand, however, has maintained a separate murder statute
(called culpable homicide). See id. at 24. Gobert defends this statute, arguing that
"[p]erhaps this concession to public opinion in the case of intentional killings is not
only pragmatically but also theoretically justifiable. It is right that the criminal law
signify the qualitative difference between murder and all other crimes." Id. In
making this argument, doesn't Gobert allow luck to enter into the criminal law? If
the qualitative difference between murder and another crime (attempted murder, for
example) is the presence of a dead body, aren't we giving credence and moral signifi-
cance to the role of luck? Further, since the term "murder" was replaced with
"culpable homicide," can it even be said that the statute is adequately expressing
public opinion? See infra text accompanying note 227 (suggesting the significance of
labeling).
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1. Causal Overdetermination
Betty and Carla both shoot at Alex at exactly the same time.
Alex dies. Betty and Carla are both guilty of purposeful endanger-
ment.
2. Transferred Intent
Alice shoots at Betty, but the bullet hits and kills Carla. Alice
would be guilty of purposeful endangerment as toward Betty, and
reckless or negligent endangerment as toward Carla. If either Betty
or Carla were a law enforcement officer, Alice's crime toward either
would be dependent upon the statute. Thus, if Feola219 applies,
Alice would be subjected to greater penalties for endangering the
one who was the officer. Finally, if both Betty and Carla were
injured, Alice would be guilty of the reckless or negligent endanger-
ment of Carla and the purposeful endangerment of Betty.
3. Attempts
Alice shoots at Betty but misses. Alice is guilty of purposeful
endangerment.
4. Intervening Actors
Alice prepares to shoot Betty, but Carla grabs the gun and
shoots Betty herself. Alice and Carla are both guilty of purposeful
endangerment.
5. Thin-Skull Rule
Alice, attempting only a minor injury, punches Betty during gym
class. Betty is a hemophiliac and bleeds to death. Here, Alice may
not have suspected that Betty could die from the punch, and
indeed, most reasonable people might not expect it either. Hence,
Alice would not even be negligent as to the fact that she was
endangering the life of another. Alice is guilty only of assaulting
Betty (or the resultless crime equivalent) but will not be prosecuted
under a life endangerment statute.
220
219 420 U.S. 671 (1975). For a discussion of Feola, see supra notes 130-33, 214 and
accompanying text.
220 If, on the other hand, Betty walked around in a T-shirt that read "Don't punch
me, I'm a hemophiliac," Alice could be charged with knowledge, recklessness, or at
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6. Recklessness
Alice, Betty, Carla, and Denise all get drunk and then go driving.
Alice hits a car, but no one dies. Betty hits a car and kills one
person. Carla hits a school bus and kills fifty children. Denise
drives home and gets some sleep. Alice, Betty, Carla, and Denise
are all guilty of reckless endangerment. Should Carla be prosecuted
for fifty violations of the statute or perhaps subjected to greater
sanctions? Doing so would allow her bad luck to penalize her.
Betty, for instance, would have hit a school bus with seventy
children in it were it not for the fact that she happened to get stuck
at a red light. Hence, removing luck from the calculus, Carla is
guilty of just one charge of reckless endangerment, as are the
others.
C. Presume Causation and Results
A third option would be to create, through legal fiction, the
causation or result the actor intended when by chance the result
does not occur. Running through our various cases, such an
approach would yield the following results.
1. Causal Overdetermination
Jack and Jill both shoot at Karen at the same time. Karen dies.
If the court uses a test that holds them both to be causes, Jack and
Jill are guilty of murder. If the court finds neither can be a cause,
the court will legally imply a causal link and hold both guilty of
murder.
2. Transferred Intent
Luke shoots at Laura but misses and hits Scotty. The court
would hold Luke guilty of manslaughter for Scotty's death and then
assume that Laura had died. Since that is what Luke intended, he
would be charged with murder. If Laura were a law enforcement
officer, Luke would be guilty of murdering a law enforcement offi-
cer. And if Scotty were a law enforcement officer, Luke would be
the very least negligence depending upon whether she believed that Betty's death was
practically certain, whether she consciously disregarded the risk of Betty's death, or
whether she was unreasonably unaware that punching a hemophiliac could result in
death. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (defining the various mental states:
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently).
THE ROLE OF LUCK IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
guilty of the manslaughter of a law enforcement official (if such a
statute existed). Finally, if Luke hit both Laura and Scotty, the
court would not have to imply any causal connection or result:
Luke would be guilty of manslaughter and murder.
3. Attempts
John shoots at Wayne but misses. The court finds a death where
there is none and holds John guilty of murder.
4. Intervening Actors
Sam intends to shoot and kill Rhonda when Tom slits her throat.
Tom is guilty of murder. Sam will also be held guilty of murder
because the court will imply a causal link between Sam's actions and
Rhonda's death.
5. Thin-Skull Rule
Martha stabs George in the arm, intending solely to injure him.
George is a hemophiliac and dies from the wound. Here, the court
would not need to find causation or a result-they are both present.
What is missing is Martha's intention to kill George. Since even a
reasonable person would not expect such a result (and thus Martha
is not negligent), Martha will only be guilty of assault.
6. Recklessness
Erin, Fred, Greg, and Harry all decide it would be fun to drop
bricks one by one from the top of the Empire State Building. (They
do not aim at anyone. They just like the sound of the bricks hitting
the concrete.) Erin breaks one person's toes. Fred kills one person.
Greg kills fifty people. Harry does not hit anyone. Erin, Fred, and
Harry are all guilty of manslaughter. Greg is guilty of fifty counts
of manslaughter.
D. Weighing the Options
As evidenced by the above illustrations, most of the defendants
would be punished to the same degree no matter which approach
was taken. However, both the special problem posed by reckless-
ness and the anticipated societal response to any of these solutions
must be examined in order to determine which solution to adopt.
1994] 2233
2234 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 2183
1. Recklessness Revisited
Recklessness2 21 involves uncertainties. Unlike purpose or
knowledge, it is difficult to predict what harm the reckless defen-
dant might cause or might intend to cause. Alice might open fire
in the middle of a shopping mall at nine in the morning when
hardly anyone is there but still kill twenty people. Betty might open
fire at six in the evening on Christmas Eve yet kill no one. Betty,
however, posed more of a danger than Alice. Betty is also more
culpable than Alice because she consciously disregarded a greater
risk. Thus, it seems any approach to recklessness will necessarily
entail a prediction as to what harm would typically occur.222 We
would expect Betty would kill a large number of people and Alice
would kill very few. Therefore, Betty should be punished more
severely than Alice.
The problem with recklessness seems to be that we all take risks
in life. If we are having problems punishing perpetrators for the
harms that materialize from their reckless acts, perhaps we should
compromise and punish manslaughter and other reckless crimes less
severely than we do. This would eliminate problems ofjury nullifi-
cation 228 and reflect the fact that this is a society where we accept
the occasional risks most people undertake.
2 24
This solution could be reached under any of the three options.
When Alice and Betty are charged with manslaughter, the judge and
jury can evaluate their actions and the potential harm they
posed 225 and punish them accordingly. And if both are arrested
for reckless endangerment, they can be punished in light of the
danger they presented.
2 1
"' For the sake of simplicity, I am not discussing negligence along with reck-
lessness. The arguments and problems presented, however, also apply to negligence.
Seesupra note 18 (discussing the use of proximate causation in such determina-
tions).
' See Schulhofer, supra note 46, at 1529-30, 1532 ("[F]requently it was clear that
refusal to convict resulted more from a more general jury hostility to condemning
negligent conduct as criminal, in a case of death or serious injury." (footnote
omitted)).
' See id. at 1543-44 (noting the small chance of deterring reckless/negligent
drivers because they consider the risk of causing harm to be very remote if they
consider it at all).
' Until society comes to understand the insignificance of the resulting harm,
perhaps the results of crimes would be inadmissible as unduly prejudicial and irrele-
vant. Obviously, if the results were needed to prove the act occurred, the evidence
would be admissible, but if the state's case were proven without the results, it would
serve no purpose to reveal the results to the jury.
26 See Gobert, supra note 157, at 22 (arguing that sometimes results might be
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2. Societal Response
a. Endangerment Statutes
Endangerment statutes do not carry with them the stigma
attached to crimes such as murder, rape, or manslaughter, as
Gobert recognizes. 227 Indeed, even if people would eventually
learn from the law the irrelevance of luck, the concept of murder is
so ingrained in our language that endangerment could never
replace it. Could there ever be a television show called "Purposeful
Endangerment, She Wrote?" Although conceptually correct, the
idea of endangerment runs contrary to our societal sentiments.
While these should not prevail over logical and moral coherence, if
other options are available, it may be best to use them.
b. Presuming Causation and Results
It may be argued that while presuming causation or a result
prevents legal fictions such as transferred intent, it ultimately
creates new ones. When John shoots at Mary and misses, how can
we say John killed Mary when Mary is alive and well? Further,
consider the case in which Tom puts slow-acting poison in Sandra's
soup, but then Doug shoots her while she is eating it. When the
coroner's report says that Sandra died from the bullet wound, how
can we say that Tom caused Sandra's demise?
To say that we do not care that this is a legal fiction puts us
right back where we started-substituting logical coherence for
correct results. But does this necessarily have to be a fiction?
Aren't Tom and John murderers in the sense that they intentionally
set forth to bring about the death of another human being? Since
they are cold-blooded killers whether or not their actions bring
about their intended results, is there anything inconsistent with
labeling them as such? Indeed, although this approach may take
time to find acceptance, it attaches to wrongdoers the stigma that
is rightly theirs.
228
A greater problem created by this solution is that it gives effect
to that which is irrelevant. If we decide that results are the product
relevant in sentencing as indicators of dangerousness).
2" See id. at 24.
22 In such a case, a reckless driver would be convicted of manslaughter, not
reckless driving; she would be punished to the degree that her driving (considering
speed, time of night, and so forth) manifested a conscious disregard for human life.
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of luck, we should eliminate them; we should not give them a
primary role. For example, imagine that all crimes that happen on
Tuesdays receive greater punishments than those occurring on other
days. Laurel punches Eric on Tuesday, and she is punished with
death. Carol, on the other hand, punches Judd on Wednesday and
is punished with a jail sentence of five days. We suddenly realize
that differences in punishments, like those between Laurel and
Carol, are occurring solely because unfortunate people like Laurel
are committing their crimes on Tuesday, and for some unknown
reason we seem to be giving weight to that fact. We then determine
that what day of the week a crime occurs does not contribute to the
culpability of the perpetrator; hence, the fact that some crimes
occurred on Tuesdays is irrelevant, and thus Laurel and Carol
should be receiving the same amount of punishment. What this
solution, presuming causation and results, tells us to do is to
suppose that all crimes occur on Tuesdays (namely, that Carol
committed the crime on Tuesday not Wednesday) rather than
ignoring the day of the week.
c. Equating the Punishments
The third approach was to punish incomplete crimes the same
as completed crimes. The problem presented is not that of public
response, but rather the lack thereof. The average person is
probably not aware of the extent of penalties for most crimes. She
may be aware of the now increased penalties for drug-related
offenses or whether the death penalty is available in her state. It is
highly doubtful, however, that if you asked her what the range of
sentencing available for attempted murder is, she would be able to
tell you. Thus, rather than a response of public outrage at new
sentencing guidelines, there may be no response at all.
While this may be initially helpful in passing the legislation, the
public's ambivalence toward the degree of punishment may prevent
true equivalence. This prevention would be the result of the public
maintaining a dichotomy between completed and incomplete
crimes. Although our sense ofjustice would be served because both
crimes would be punished equally, people would still cling to the
harm distinction that plagues the criminal law today. Thus, only
changing the sentencing guidelines might not allow the criminal law
to reinforce the equal severity of both crimes.
If the public were educated about the change in sentencing, the
problem remains that the completed and incomplete crimes will be
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viewed as somehow distinct. Continuing to emphasize results while
maintaining that they do not matter would make the criminal law
contradictory at its core.
E. Conclusions
Endangerment statutes, presuming causation, and equal
punishment will all yield the same, correct results. As all three solve
the dilemmas herein posed, selection should be made with an eye
toward practical consequences. Endangerment statutes abandon
deeply ingrained conceptions of what one does when one takes a
gun and fires it toward someone-they purposefully endanger; they
do not murder. Legally implying the causation/result element may
alleviate the distinction, but it does so at the risk of creating
another legal fiction 229 and giving weight to the irrelevant. Equal
punishment but different definitions may fail to erase the arbitrary
line drawn between completed and incomplete crimes. Each
solution has its consequences, and any legislator must evaluate how
society will react and how she wants society to be before choosing
between them.
CONCLUSION
Although we cannot altogether avoid the role of chance in our
lives, it should not be a part of the criminal law. Currently, courts
are contorting the doctrine of causation and twisting the idea of
intentions in order to avoid fortuity. Further, courts still give
chance happenings moral weight in the realm of attempt liability.
While no solution is without its problems, we must adopt a solution
that takes a clear stance on luck-that it does not matter. Until we
do so, our legal system may be no better than Tessie's.
2 Whether doing so will be a legal fiction will depend upon whether the public
adopts the conception that one who attempts to kill is a murderer and one who
attempts to steal is a thief. If the public maintains a distinction between the two-
there are killers and attempters-this solution will create the same problem it attempts
to solve: it will avoid the role of luck by contorting other legal concepts.
1994] 2237

